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Abstract 
 
The Efficacy of Comedy: Focusing on the efficacy of comedy as a genre, utilizing Aristotle, 
Nietzsche, and Heidegger’s philosophy.  It begins with a historical analysis of the efficacy of 
comedy in Ancient 4
th
 and 5
th
 century Athens focusing on Aristotle’s conceptions of comedy. It 
analyses what Aristotle wrote about comedy and attempts a reconstruction of what his book on 
comedy from the poetics may have said.  It then examines the shift to aesthetics rather than the 
Philosophy of Art with a focus on Kant and the Critique of Judgment.  Comedy here is used as 
an interpretive tool in order to highlight the shortcomings of Aesthetics.  It then examines 
comedy and its potential for being a truly great art form and explicates a Heideggerian 
interpretation of comedy. This novel interpretation describes two types of comedy: True comedy 
and Fallen comedy. Finally, it provides a Nietzschean perspective, particularly as it pertains to 
the power of comedy and laughter and its ability to overcome the exclusive mono-perspective 
found in the ascetic ideal and its overestimation of the efficacy of truth in our contemporary 
context. 
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Introduction: The Efficacy of Comedy 
 
Philosophy on comedy, humor, and laughter is sparse and fragmentary throughout the history of 
the canon. There is a lacuna of sorts until the twentieth century in the area of philosophy. The 
first monographs solely devoted to comedy and laughter are Henri Bergson’s Laughter and 
Freud’s Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious. The only notable exceptions are the 
alleged lost work by Aristotle on comedy that should belong in the Poetics mirroring his section 
on tragedy, and the Earl of Shaftsbury’s (Anthony Ashley Cooper’s) Sensus Communis: An 
Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour from 1709, where the term “humor” first starts to 
mean something “funny” rather than the medical term for the humors of the body. The latter half 
of the twentieth century has seen a greater proliferation of books and articles dealing with the 
topics of comedy, laughter, and humor, and I attribute this to the prevalence of the now 
preeminent genre of comedy in our society. 
The primary arts of our culture (in the US) are television, film, and popular music. It has 
been said that if all poetry, sculpture, and painting stopped in this country, few would even 
notice, but if there were a halt in film, television, and streaming media, there would be an uproar. 
Our world (in the Heideggerian sense) or culture’s art has lost its sense of the tragic. Very rarely 
are tragic movies produced by major film studios, and still more rarely are these films major 
blockbusters. As it turns out, many movies have their endings changed to be more “upbeat” or 
“uplifting” or “even funny” if they do not “test well” with focus groups. Most of our films are 
comedies in the sense either that they are meant to be humorous or that they have a “happy 
2 
ending.”1 Rather than trying to recapture a sense of the tragic, I would like to examine this 
comedic phenomenon genealogically. 
I intend to craft a counterhistory of comedy that discloses the countenance of its efficacy 
while simultaneously addressing a major problem within the philosophy of art. Though comedy 
may be the US’s preeminent genre, it falls into an odd space when we consider it aesthetically. 
Aesthetics is what we currently refer to as the philosophy of art. This is problematic for many 
reasons. First, aesthetics as a field is really only a few hundred years old and is myopic in its 
view toward art. Second, and more importantly, it really does not adequately address or assess 
comedy, especially comedy considered as a concrete, theatrical art form and not just as joking or 
general humor. This is especially troubling given that comedy along with tragedy are two of the 
West’s oldest forms of “art,” if we can even call them that. The term art itself is not without its 
own genealogical problems. I plan to use comedy as an interpretive tool in dismantling the 
dualistic aesthetic framework and to show how it falls short of its transcendental and universalist 
aims. Even if aesthetic experience were to achieve its end, it would still ring hollow when 
compared to “art” in a context. 
Before I begin, I must tersely adumbrate the leading theories on the philosophy of humor 
and laughter. This work deals more with the topic of comedy than with either humor or laughter, 
but it is not feasible to talk about comedy or comedic acts without at least an initial 
understanding of what we have come to think of as the predominant theories of humor and 
                                                          
1
 See Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Random House, 1967). 
Nietzsche claims at the end of section 5 of Birth of Tragedy that “the entire comedy of art is neither performed for 
our betterment or education nor are we the true authors of this art world. On the contrary, we may assume that we 
are merely images and artistic projections for the true author [the will?], and that we have our highest dignity in our 
significance as works of art—for it is only as an aesthetic phenomenon that existence and the world are eternally 
justified … [we are not] as the sole author and spectator of this comedy of art, [which] prepares a perpetual 
entertainment for itself.” By the “comedy of art” I believe Nietzsche is pointing out that all art is an illusion that has 
a “happy ending.” Even when viewing a tragedy, we are not literally hurt by it; in fact, we feel better after and 
applaud it. 
3 
laughter. The first and perhaps oldest is standardly referred to as the superiority theory, which is 
attributed to Hobbes but has its roots in Plato, as most things do. In book 10 of Plato’s Republic, 
as well as in Philebus lines 48–50, it appears, at least according to the assent of the interlocutors, 
that laughter is somehow malicious. We laugh at absurdities or at other people’s 
misunderstandings of themselves. Hobbes, on the other hand, has been oft quoted for his general 
explication of the comic or laughable as “a sudden glory arising from some conception of some 
eminency in ourselves, by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly.”2 
This theory has been criticized often and quite well for being very myopic or incomplete.
3
 
Perhaps it is an instance of why we laugh or why we find things humorous, but certainly not the 
form. I doubt that there is any universal form or complete, all-encompassing theory for what we 
find humorous or laughable. 
The second prominent theory is the relief theory, which is mostly popularized by and 
attributed to Sigmund Freud and Herbert Spencer.
4
 The main idea is that our nervous energy is 
released or relieved through humor or laughter, as a sort of “release valve.” Mostly this is 
thought to take our pent-up, malicious desires, anxieties, and sexual tensions and release or 
relieve them through jokes, humor, and laughter. Aside from issues with what exactly this 
nervous energy is, the precise mechanisms surrounding this seemingly hydraulic system are also 
unclear. Much like the superiority theory, relief theory seems to only describe one instance and is 
thus equally myopic. 
                                                          
2
 Thomas Hobbes, Human Nature, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, vol. 4, ed. William 
Molesworth (London: Bohn, 1840), 46; cf. Hobbes, Leviathan, in The English Works of Thomas Hobbes, vol. 3, ed. 
William Molesworth (London: Bohn, 1839), I, 6. 
3
 Francis Hutcheson was perhaps the first to criticize this theory well and at length in his 1750 work Reflections 
upon Laughter. 
4
 Sigmund Freud, Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious, in Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 5, trans. James Strachey (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963); Herbert Spencer, “On the 
Physiology of Laughter,” in Essays on Education and Kindred Subjects (London: Dent, 1911). 
4 
The third and most prominent theory is the incongruity theory. This theory in its many 
forms basically states that when we find something suddenly incongruous and we are not in a 
fearful state and we find this incongruity pleasant, we may find the phenomena humorous or 
laughable. This theory seems to stem from many sources, including the aforementioned Platonic 
dialogue the Philebus; Immanuel Kant’s Third Critique, division 1, section 54; Schopenhauer’s 
The World as Will and Representation, book 1, section 3; and Henri Bergson’s Laughter. 
Contemporary philosophers such as John Morreall and Noёl Carroll also promote this theory as 
the most prominent and preeminent theory of comedy.  
Morreall espouses an aesthetic interpretation of comedy, humor, and laughter. Morreall 
technically claims he has a “new theory of laughter,” but it is more or less a nuanced version of 
the incongruity theory.
5
 He claims that what causes laughter or humor is “a sudden pleasant 
psychological/cognitive shift.”6 Carroll also strongly supports the incongruity theory and 
attempts to overcome some of its problems related to its broadness of scope. Things that are too 
congruent seem incongruent, like identical twins dressed the same, excellent impersonations, 
caricature art, and general repetitions. He and Morreall, along with Bergson, argue that these 
things are perceived as incongruent with our understanding of the world. But this still seems 
problematic. If the “too congruent” seems “incongruent” it would appear that the definition of 
incongruity must grow so vague as to no longer be meaningful. Everything can thus be perceived 
as incongruity. I agree with Carroll and Morreall that incongruity is the best of the three theories, 
but it too seems to fall short of a properly a priori or formal definition. Frankly, I do not think it 
is possible to provide this kind of definition for humor, laughter, or comedy. Comedy, at least, is 
                                                          
5
 John Morreall, “A New Theory of Laughter,” in The Philosophy of Laughter and Humor (Albany: SUNY 
University Press, 1987). He states “humor always involves the enjoyment of a perceived or imagined incongruity” 
(135). 
6
 Morreall, “A New Theory of Laughter,” 133; see also John Morreall, Comic Relief: A Comprehensive Philosophy 
of Humor (West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 50. 
5 
always an a posteriori endeavor. Comedy is always contextual in its form. All of these theories 
on comedy get something right given certain shared contexts. 
I will start by examining the roots of comedy in ancient Greece, focusing on Aristotle and 
Aristophanes. Next I will move to an analysis of modern aesthetics that focuses on Kant’s 
influence in this field owing to his contributions from the Third Critique. I will claim that Kant 
or at least neo-Kantian philosophers have led us astray from much of what I take to be important 
in a history’s or culture’s art (because of his claims about universal aesthetic taste). I will use 
Heidegger to provide an interpretation of how comedy can be both an inauthentic art that is just 
an idle curiosity, or what I call “fallen comedy”; or it can alternatively be world-creating and 
truth-disclosing art that I call “true comedy.” Finally, I will delve into Nietzsche’s corpus to 
show what efficacy he thinks comedy and laughter have.  
It should be noted from the outset that in this project, no hard and fast universals about 
comedy are to be drawn, since part of the project of genealogy is to uncover or unmask these as 
being historically contingent. However, the greater claim of this project is that, though comedy 
has been mostly ignored or misunderstood by “serious” thinkers and has been thought of as mere 
amusement or diversion, it still has had and does have a greater efficacy on people than it 
generally gets credit for. Comedy, when it appears in a historical milieu, is an important part of 
cultural discourse. Just because comedy is not “serious,” this does not mean that it is not 
impactful, meaningful, or useful for further meditation (though Kant claims that it is not). 
Comedy can spur us to meaningful action and thought without needing to rely on a “serious” 
attitude. To quote Nietzsche from The Gay Science, “The lovely human beast always seems to 
lose its good spirits when it thinks well; it becomes ‘serious.’ And ‘where laughter and gaiety are 
6 
found, thinking does not amount to anything’: that is the prejudice of this serious beast against 
all ‘gay science.’—Well then, let us prove this is a prejudice.”7  
 In chapter 1, “The Birth of Comedy,” I plan to examine the ancient Greek roots of 
comedy from the fourth and fifth centuries BCE. I will be examining them to discover what 
theories of comedy prevailed, and to see whether those theories appropriately characterize the 
comedy of that era. I will first address the issue of katharsis in Aristotle’s texts, mostly by 
appealing to scholarship from Lear and Golden.
8
 This chapter will primarily focus on Aristotle 
and attempt a reconstruction of Aristotle’s lost book on comedy that is supposed to comprise a 
large portion of the Poetics. This reconstruction is necessary in order to describe a possible 
perspective of comedy using the resources of that era and not attempting to retrofit a modern, 
universal interpretation of comedy where it does not belong. We will first attend to other 
attempted reconstructions from Cooper, Janko, and Golden. I will endorse Golden’s 
interpretation over the others, especially those that rely on the Tractate.  
If Leon Golden is correct in his interpretation of katharsis as an “intellectual 
clarification” of concepts of fear and pity for tragedy or indignation and confidence for comedy, 
then we can see in what ways comedy was meant to be efficacious for that era. Golden examines 
the Rhetoric and the Poetics to determine that righteous indignation is the cathartic aim of 
comedy for Aristotle. Following his method, I claim that cathartic confidence (θάpσος) is also 
the aim of Aristotle’s lost work. Aristotelian concepts tend to have a reciprocal balance with each 
other. Confidence is the opposite of fear in the Rhetoric. Thus, confidence would be the state of 
mind that comedy addresses, along with righteous indignation.
9
 
                                                          
7
 Friedrich Nietzsche, “Taking Seriously,” in The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 
1976), 327. 
8
 Jonathan Lear, “Katharsis,” Phronesis 33, no. 3 (1988): 297–326. 
9
 Rhetoric 1383a–b is about the state of mind of confidence 
7 
Finally, this chapter concludes by assessing how poorly aesthetics fits into this ancient 
framework. It appears utterly anachronistic to insert an aesthetic interpretation of comedy here or 
to even try and make an interpretation about “art” in this era. This will lead us to examine why 
we would even begin to assess these forms of mimēsis in such a way, which inevitably leads us 
to the late modern theories of aesthetics found most prominently in Kant’s Third Critique. 
 In chapter 2, “This Kant Be Funny: Aesthetics, Beauty, and Comedy,” I examine Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment, part 1, division 1. This chapter will outline how Kant attempts to divorce 
all contexts from art in order to allow room for “pure aesthetic judgments,” which must always 
be about form devoid of content. Further, instead of allowing for a people to take a stand on a 
meaningful decision allowing for a happening of truth (in the Heideggerian sense, this is what 
counts as good art), a universal judgment devoid of concepts rears its “beautiful” head. This 
chapter will also analyze why we give preference to the “beautiful” rather than the “comedic.” 
Late modern philosophers of aesthetics often tend to rest their arguments for beauty in the camp 
of intelligent design. Perhaps absurdity and unintelligent design seems to be at least equipollent 
in argument if not fully aporetic.  
Kant’s Third Critique takes out all elements of the conceptual cultural context of what 
makes art meaningful and replaces them with “subjective universal” judgment divorced from 
these concepts.
10
 Art is not about the world that it opens up and instantiates but about the 
individual within a dualistic framework of mind/soul and body. This dualism simultaneously 
denigrates the body and divides aesthetics from that which makes it possible, i.e., sensation 
coming from the body. According to Kant, art is about each individual being capable of making 
judgments on beauty that has only to do with the free play of the imagination with our 
                                                          
10
 Technically, Kant is only addressing the beautiful and the sublime, but in general his work is taken as a critique of 
art and nature. 
8 
understanding and its universal communicability. In fact, it seems in terms of this judgment that 
the only standard by which art is judged is in how long we linger over the artwork owing to the 
free play and universal communicability of our imagination and judgment’s free play and its 
universal communicability. 
I will then investigate how Kant denigrates comedy further through his claim that it has 
only to do with bodily health (which from Kant is a criticism, since health cannot be universal, 
nor anything bodily), that it lacks the dignity that the “fine arts” are supposed to have, and that it 
is not something that anyone wants to be held accountable for or something that one would 
meditate on for later judgment. Comedy is relegated to that which is merely “agreeable,” which 
means it cannot be a purely aesthetic judgment of reflective taste. 
Finally, I will address the most contemporary attempt at an aesthetics of comedy, 
produced by John Morreall. I will show how his understanding of comedy is myopic and how 
aesthetics in turn is problematic for comedy even in its very terminology. The concept of “comic 
amusement,” which is used by many philosophers, including Morreall, begs the question of its 
own aesthetic experience. I conclude by pointing out further nonaesthetic investigations that 
might be pursued in the works of both Nietzsche and Heidegger. According to Nietzsche, when 
we make art only about the feeling of aesthesis, we turn art into a narcotic or drug simply for the 
alleviation of our own personal suffering and the nihilistic quelling of our will to power. 
Drawing from Heidegger, we will then attempt to examine art in a nonaesthetic way that relies 
heavily on interpretations from both Being and Time and The Origin of the Work of Art. 
 In chapter 3, “Heidegger’s Neglect of Comedy, but a Heideggerian Interpretation of 
Comedy Nonetheless,” and following from what was said in the previous chapter, I will examine 
why Heidegger neglects comedy and what a Heideggerian interpretation of comedy would look 
9 
like. This chapter will deal heavily with Heidegger’s Origin of the Work of Art and Being and 
Time, along with some reference to the late works of Heidegger. It will also talk about what 
comedy qualifies as a “great work” or what I will come to call true comedy, and what comedy 
exists only to help us continue to be involved in inauthentic falling, which I will call fallen 
comedy.
11
 This chapter will also talk about truth as a happening that occurs because of the 
meaningful working out of the decisions of a people. This truth arises as a direct result of art—in 
this case, as a result of comedy being efficacious within the context of that community. The 
political in comedy can be continuously used as the working out of a decision only if the context 
is broad enough to encompass more than one fixed situation in time. This is also why we see 
bodily humor as the only truly eternal comic element. The body is always something being put 
into question and is up for decision in a meaningful context. We cannot escape the body’s sexual, 
excretory, and uncoordinated facets, yet these facets come up in comic speech as something that 
must be put up for a decision about what is “holy and unholy,” or more likely, what is 
“humorous and unhumorous.” As Bergson points out, there is a mind/body disconnect wherein 
we would like all of our actions to accord with a perfect mental grace and agility, but our bodies 
are clumsy and uncontrollable at times.  
Heidegger’s own neglect of the body contributes to his missing this vital role of comedy 
taken as the genre, which is the genre of art par excellence for dealing with bodies and their 
functions. In comedy, we can see that we must take a stand for or against particular social and 
political phenomena. It is also through this working out of truth that certain works of comedy fall 
into such world-decay, as Heidegger puts it, that they become irrelevant and are lost. Some 
                                                          
11
 This portion will be dealing with Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward S. 
Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 276, 298, 303 (among others). 
10 
works of comedy become “unfunny,” obscure, or unethical, and are again made irrelevant.12 
Works like Lysistrata today put into question different decisions than they had in their original 
contexts. These works open up different worlds and instantiate new truths as they are worked out 
by a people. These works are efficacious in the social and political spheres to the extent that they 
transform speech and thought in such a way that puts up for decision the phenomena which they 
deal with. Further, the community that comedy addresses is very particular. Part of comedy’s 
hypercontextualization has to do with its directedness toward a particular audience. Comedy is 
crafted to communicate with a very particular audience and becomes great when it can 
communicate beyond these bounds. 
 Finally, in chapter 4, “The Conclusion; the Use and Abuse of Comedy for Life—Notes 
for a Nietzschean Philosophy of Comedy,” I will explicate Nietzsche’s perceived threat of 
nihilism. This threat of nihilism is found throughout his corpus as a problem of utmost 
importance. Chapter 4 will look at his attempts at trying to achieve “Gay Science.” It will also 
deal with the importance of fictions as opposed to the exclusive monoperspectives found in the 
ascetic ideal. Comedy and genealogy are a way of taking the world less “seriously” so that we 
can more easily change our traditions and beliefs when they no longer serve us well.
13
 
Any dogmatic ethics has an inured quality about it; every ethics based on honor and 
purity has a level of pride that will not allow them to be changed without shame. When you hold 
some set of beliefs as apodictically true, you appear foolish when it comes up short. People 
generally hate appearing foolish, but an ethics that embraces or at the very least accepts 
foolishness would not have to respond with hatred. When we hold our beliefs to the standard of a 
                                                          
12
 Sometimes when a work of comedy is deemed “unethical” it is preserved as an example of what was once thought 
funny, but is now considered unethical. 
13
 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1989), part 3, §27. 
11 
supreme fiction, we have a back door to escape shame. And just because something is comic 
does not mean that it is less valuable or that it has less meaning.  
The comic can be of great importance to our lives and the way that we comport 
ourselves. The comic can have just as great an impact on us as anything considered under the 
guise of “seriousness.” As Nietzsche points out, there are just better interpretations and 
descriptions.
14
 Why is it then the case that in ethics it is so hard to take the same approach? We 
have a long history of trying the same experiments with the same results in the field of ethics. As 
Nietzsche points out, perhaps we should consider another perspective for this field; perhaps a 
less serious and more comic approach.
15
 
 These four chapters serve to explicate a novel genealogical approach to the genre of 
comedy in the West. They serve to scrutinize comedy philosophically as it has emerged in 
different eras in the West, particularly in ancient Athens, the late modern period, and the 
nineteenth through twenty-first centuries. This dissertation attempts to unearth missed 
opportunities for engaging in comedy in a “serious” way, in the philosophies of Aristotle, Kant, 
Nietzsche, and Heidegger. It engages with comedy in the historically anchored, contingent 
philosophies of particular eras. Comedy as a concrete theatrical genre has always been present in 
the West but has with few exceptions constantly been ignored.  
This dissertation addresses particular philosophers in particular eras and shows what 
additional philosophical work could be done and how it can be done. This work aims to give 
comedy the due diligence it deserves. It aims to break down the dualistic divisions of aesthetics 
that have been a serious stopgap for the proper study of comedy’s efficacy. I claim Aristotle 
                                                          
14
 Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), §14. 
15
 This portion of the dissertation will cover a plethora of works by Nietzsche, and Foucault’s History of Sexuality 
series. This portion will also cover Cynthia Willet’s work Irony in the Age of Empire (2008) which is where the idea 
for this libidinal ethics started. 
12 
shows a way that comedy was efficacious before aesthetics. I show how Kant and neo-Kantian 
aesthetics cannot engage with comedy in a way that can take it as efficacious, but instead 
relegate it to “mere amusement.” This dissertation describes a Heideggerian way of interpreting 
comedy in a Late Modern to post-Modern way such that it is efficacious. Finally, this work 
points to a novel way to interpret future comedy in an efficacious way using a Nietzschean 
interpretation. Thus, through this dissertation we can see how to more effectively address 
comedy’s efficacy in a historical light devoid of the myopic aesthetic lens that has, until this 
point, dominated the discourse of the philosophy of art. This work provides an interpretive tool 
to help address the greater enfranchisement of comedy’s place in history. These novel 
interpretations of the philosophers I have addressed herein can provide the grounding for new 
counterhistorical narratives, in the Foucauldian sense, the likes of which have not yet been 
attempted. 
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Chapter 1: The Birth of Comedy 
 
1.1. Aesthetics and the Art before Art 
I will identify and examine Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophical views on comedy from their 
extant works. I will then explicate the kathartic view of art found in the Poetics and Politics of 
Aristotle. I point out why the kathartic view is not the most important way of engaging with 
drama for Aristotle. I then look at others’ attempts to reconstruct Aristotle’s lost book on 
comedy. I argue that the Tractatus Coislinianus is not a good starting point for this, as Janko and 
Cooper have claimed. I side with Golden on his interpretation of Aristotelian comedy and add to 
his interpretation, using resources from the Rhetoric as he does. I use several examples from 
Aristophanes to explicate my interpretation of Aristotelian comedy. Finally, I argue the functions 
of comedy and tragedy for Aristotle are to persuade and educate, as they are for Aristophanes. 
This chapter serves to show how to genealogically engage in drama and particularly comedy 
without being engaged in anything that resembles aesthetic philosophy. Thus, we can examine 
the comedy of the ancient Athenians in a new way as a result of this analysis.  
That art should issue an aesthetic judgment has been the predominant point of view for 
the philosophy of art since roughly the eighteenth century. The field itself is most often called 
aesthetics rather than the wordier philosophy of art. Starting with Baumgarten, Burke, 
Shaftesbury, and Kant, aesthetic judgment has been the raison d’etre for our experiences, 
encounters, and interpretations of art.
16
 Art is made to elicit feelings or sensations that lead to 
judgments of the beautiful, the sublime, and perhaps, at least since last century, the ugly and the 
                                                          
16
 Noël Carroll, Beyond Aesthetics: Philosophical Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 5. 
14 
shocking. The body has an awkward relation to aesthetic judgments that claim to be both 
universal and a priori. For Kant, the body must necessarily play its part in the subjective end of 
the sought out universal subjective judgment. In all cases individual bodies must make their 
subjective judgments through an individual’s bodily sensation. Terry Eagleton, amongst others, 
makes a valiant attempt to bring the body back into the fold.
17
 While this solves some of the 
salient problems for aesthetics, it does not serve as a solution for the system as a whole.  
Comedy is one of the oldest genres of art in the West, typically understood as emerging 
as a genre only slightly after tragedy in the public festivals of ancient Athens.
18
 An alternative 
history places comedy first, such that tragedy emerged from the satyr plays and phallic 
processions as a type of comic festive occurrence.
19
 Comedy or the comedic is always contextual 
and thus requires an experiential a posteriori understanding that excludes it necessarily from the 
a priori realm that is the prerequisite of a pure and proper universal subjective aesthetic 
judgment.
20
 It is true that comedy often involves the body or has the body as its object. 
Moreover, it deals with a body deeply inscribed in a context, in a culture, and in a world. The 
judgments being made about a comedic work do not often fit into the categories of the beautiful 
or the sublime. An argument could be made that the bodily elements involved in the sublime 
could be reconciled with comedy, but really a comedy is not like the starry sky, the heaved-up 
ocean or the pyramids.
21
 
                                                          
17
 See Terry Eagleton, Ideology of the Aesthetic (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1990). Also see Joanne Waugh and 
Jennifer Ingle, The End of Feminist Aesthetics: Bodies, Images, and Art (New York: Springer, forthcoming).  
18
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As Hans Belting has pointed out in his book Likeness and Presence: A History of the 
Image before the Era of Art,
22
 there was a time before art (or at least what we now call art and 
especially the “fine arts”). This was an era where the image reigned supreme in its influence over 
the area we now call art. In the ancient Greek world, they had no word, properly speaking, for 
art. We encounter only technē (τέχνη) or craft, poiesis (ποίησις) or making/doing, and poetry 
broadly construed, and finally mimēsis (μίμησις) or imitation/representation. Mimēsis was the 
general focal point of what we might now call the philosophy of art for the ancient Greeks. This 
representation of the world through art was the focus of both Plato and Aristotle’s accounts as 
regards the major genres of “art” of their day. Plato and Aristotle also played a major role in 
creating the very categories of genres, many of which we still use today. 
 Plato looked at mimēsis as being extremely efficacious, influential, and most of all 
dangerous because of its primary pedagogical role in traditional Athenian paideia.
23
 In Plato’s 
dialogues, mimēsis showed up as especially dangerous in its dramatic forms of tragedy and 
comedy. Plato’s Socrates suggests that if philosophy were to take the place of poetry in Greek 
paideia, that the audience could learn how to deal with the emotional appeals of the world.
24
 In 
the Republic it is stated that “[t]he poet’s power to corrupt even the best man—with rare 
exceptions—is surely the most serious cause for alarm.”25 The Republic points out that through 
affecting the irrational parts of the soul the poet can corrupt the soul and character of a man, and 
we do specifically mean men, by making him behave in a way befitting only a woman.
26
 Aside 
from the sexist and militaristic implications of the statement, we see that irrational behavior in 
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poetry should not be praised. This is because it “nourishes” the irrational parts of the soul such 
that when we are affected by tragedy in our own lives rather than on the stage we will be hard 
pressed to act in what Plato’s Socrates claims is the appropriate way. This part of Plato’s The 
Republic is commonly recognized and referenced, but what is not often recognized or referenced 
is that in one short paragraph immediately following this discussion is the Republics take on 
comedy. Plato has Socrates state:  
must we not apply the same principle to the things that make us laugh? … Here, too, your 
reason is at work admonishing the comic in you so that you will not gain the reputation of 
a buffoon. But when others joke, you let your comic sense run loose. Indulging it, you 
return to your own affairs and discover that you have unwittingly become a comic poet.
27
 
 
It is rather clear from the context that becoming a “comic poet” is a term of reproach and not one 
of honor.
28
 What matters here is that Plato considers comedy on equal footing with tragedy in its 
ability to corrupt and in its efficacy to shape one’s character. Essentially, Plato has Socrates 
claiming that both of these types of poetry are inappropriately persuading and educating the 
polis. 
Aristotle, in his Poetics, does not just simply examine tragedy, comedy, and epic in order 
to judge their value according to Plato’s particular understanding of paideia. In addition, 
Aristotle attempts to articulate the technical essence of a good epic, tragedy, or comedy. By 
essence I mean the necessary components that make the genre the genre it is and not something 
else. By good I mean the work flourishing in its function and best achieving its end/telos. The 
proper function for mimēsis in Aristotle’s Poetics is to produce particular emotions or feelings in 
its audience. When this function achieves its full fruition, i.e., when it is optimally fulfilling its 
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telos, it does not just elicit emotions; it educates. This particular function is one that the aesthetic 
understanding of art cannot recover, as aesthetic judgments do not serve this educational 
function, at least not according to Kant from the Critique of Judgment.
29
 The Poetics appears to 
explain how to best produce pleasant, relaxing, and, when flourishing in its function, educational 
modes of mimēsis. To this end the Poetics appears to be an excellent manual for achieving this. 
Some scholars, such as Jonathan Lear, disparage the idea that Aristotle is writing simply 
a technical manual in his Poetics. Lear believes that this work must have been a defense of 
poetics against Plato, a sort of rejoinder to the censorship of the Republic, but this does not seem 
evident.
30
 Aristotle wrote some technical manuals, such as the Categories (which contains a 
treatise on Logic) and the Rhetoric, both of which are, strictly speaking, didactic. The 
Nicomachean Ethics proclaims that it is a technical manual for becoming good rather than a 
theoretical study of the good (which he claims does not do anyone any good).
31
 The Poetics may 
have a greater purpose, but I see no reason to claim that it is not also Aristotle’s idea of how to 
produce a proper epic, tragedy, or comedy such that it is appropriately efficacious to its audience. 
Lear points out Aristotle’s claim in the Politics that the poets/musicians ought to cater to the 
masses for their benefit.
32
 Aristotle, following Anacharsis, claims that relaxation and respite 
from toilsome or serious work is necessary, since we cannot work continuously.
33
 Even serious 
work for Aristotle must be moderated. An excess of this would seem to still lead to ruin. For 
instance, a surgeon who continuously works double shifts will become too tired to function at her 
best and will make mistakes that may cost lives. Thus, amusement (παιδιά) and things that are 
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laughable (γελοίων) are not the aim of the good life, but are instead a necessary part of it. 
Aristotle goes so far as to include wit (eutrapelos, or well turning)
34
 as one of the core virtues 
enumerated in the Nicomachean Ethics.
35
 Wit and comedy are certainly neither equivalent to nor 
mutually inclusive of each other, but it would seem absurd if wit were not an essential part of a 
properly functioning and flourishing dramatic comedy. Aristotle points out in Book IV of the 
Nicomachean Ethics that Old Comedy is inferior to New Comedy in its lack of subtlety and its 
excessive abuse of others. While it may seem obvious, it is necessary to point out that he directly 
links wit to comedy and also points to better and worse functioning comedies due to their ability 
to achieve a proper mean of wit and also according to their context, i.e., they are used at the right 
place, in the right time, with the right people. 
While Lear exhibits excellent critical scholarship in examining a large range of prevalent 
interpretations of katharsis for Aristotle, his interpretation seems to rest on two critical 
assumptions: first, that katharsis, as interpreted through Aristotle’s Politics,36 needs to be 
singular in purpose, and second, that it must be unique in kind. This is an overly narrow 
description of katharsis needs to be for Aristotle, and it hinders the interpretation of it because 
comedy and Tragedy are not the sort of thing that can be described in this exactitude. These 
assumptions rest on Aristotle’s claim that we should learn the distinct types of melodies that are 
in certain modes. The issue here is that while the melodies may have distinct modes, those 
distinct modes need not be singular in purpose. I see no reason why katharsis cannot purify, 
relieve, and clarify intellectually the emotions proper to tragedy and comedy.
37
 Ancient Greek 
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words are notoriously polysemic, and attempting to force katharsis into only one definition 
seems not only unnecessary but also myopic given Attic Greek, especially during the era 
preceding and during the time of Aristotle. Aristotle makes a particular point about the problem 
of precision at the very beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics. Some things like “the good” do 
not admit of a single science.
38
 There are many sciences that pertain to “the good,” and, in a 
similar way, it may be the case that the Politics’ reference to katharsis from music to relieve 
religious frenzy would be a different science than the katharsis of a play or the katharsis of the 
body in the form of discharge.
39
 Just as “the good” for horsemanship, medicine, and politics are 
all different sciences, so too it might be the case for katharsis in music, drama, and biology. 
Aristotle claims that he will explain further what he means by katharsis in the Poetics, but, much 
like the situation surrounding comedy in the Poetics, we do not possess an extant text to further 
explicate this promissory note. It could be the case that Aristotle explicated katharsis as 
described above in the lost texts of the Poetics.  
In this section on katharsis from the Politics, Aristotle talks about different melodies 
being used for different singular purposes, particularly for education, katharsis and 
entertainment, but that does not mean that tragedy or comedy must follow these narrow 
classifications. Melodies seem sufficiently different in kind from dramas; they need not follow 
the same rules. Tangentially, the actual music and melodies in a comedy would likely have 
shifted between these different melodies. It seems likely in that there would be a difference in 
melodies for the chorus in the middle of a play, like Lysistrata, where things are more relaxed 
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and funny than at the end of the play where the “moral of the story,” so to speak, might be 
learned. 
Further, we should not expect the precision of mathematics in sciences that do not admit 
of that kind of precision. Aristotle claims, in the Nicomachean Ethics, that “the type of accounts 
we demand should accord with the subject matter; the questions about actions [πράξεσι] and 
expediency, like questions about health, have no fixed answers.”40 The production of katharsis 
through mimēsis in tragedy and comedy must also count as an inexact science, especially since 
Aristotle highlights that tragedies are about actions [πράξεως] and life rather than about 
persons.
41
 By Aristotle’s own account, this places tragedies and comedies in the category of an 
inexact science. This lack of exactitude seems especially true of comedy because all comedy is 
contextualized and requires an audience either real or imagined. It is impossible to craft a joke or 
comic scene that everyone would perceive as comic, let alone will make everyone laugh. For 
these reasons, it seems overly severe for Lear to limit katharsis in these ways for comedy if not 
also for Tragedy. 
Despite Lear’s rather thorough focus on katharsis, the focus of the Poetics is elsewhere. 
As both G. F. Else and Leon Golden point out, “Aristotle does not tell us that catharsis is so 
important, that it is the “biggest” idea about tragedy [or in our case comedy].”42 Aristotle only 
mentions it once in section 6 of the Poetics. He brings up the specific tragic pleasure a few times, 
but he most frequently focuses on how to properly elicit fear and pity. That the dramatic 
performance produces a katharsis is one of its better effects, but that does not seem to be the 
“end all be all,” so to speak, of what is going on in the Poetics. What does seem of the utmost 
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importance is producing a proper mimēsis of fear and pity for a tragedy, and, as I will claim, 
indignation and confidence for comedy.  
In order to explain why comedy for Aristotle should be about indignation and confidence, 
we should first look at some scholarship about what Aristotle would have said in the lost second 
book of the Poetics and what Aristotle himself did say in the extant texts. While we could just as 
well try to show how mimēsis is an entirely different way of considering art from the view point 
of tragedy, we will follow the path of comedy, since it seems to be at the furthest possible point 
away from an aesthetic interpretation; polemically speaking, it is, perhaps, its polar opposite. 
 
1.2: The Tractate and the Point of Poetry 
We will speak later about imitation [mimēsis] in epic poetry and about Comedy. Let us 
now resume our discussion of Tragedy by deducing the definition of its essential nature 
which follows from what we have said.
43
 
 
This promissory note made by Aristotle, at the beginning of his section on tragedy in the Poetics, 
has tantalized scholars for over two millennia. This treatise on comedy, which most scholars 
agree has been lost rather than never written, has been the topic of much scholarly debate. No 
less than three well respected scholars in the last hundred years have attempted reconstructions 
of this lost treatise. Lane Cooper produced An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy,
44
 Richard Janko 
wrote Aristotle on Comedy: Towards a Reconstruction of Poetics II,
45
 and Leon Golden wrote 
various articles on the topic including “Aristotle on Comedy.”46 All three of these authors’ 
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creative reconstructions have their various strengths and weaknesses, and my intention is to 
address Janko and Golden’s works in my own attempt to reconstruct what the lost treatise on 
comedy would have said. This reconstruction will show how the function of good dramatic art, 
and, particularly comedy at this point in time, is primarily efficacious in a nonaesthetic way. This 
reconstruction will exemplify the efficacy of comedy in the era before aesthetics. My main 
method mimics Golden’s by focusing on Aristotle’s Rhetoric and Poetics postulating a parallel 
and polar relation of comedy to what pertains to tragedy in both works. Further, I follow 
Golden’s suspicions about the Aristotelian authenticity of the Tractatus Coislinianus. 
 The Tractatus Coislinianus
47
 (Tractate) is a tenth-century document, “which Cramer first 
brought to light in 1839. This untitled and anonymous document has been variously hailed as the 
key to Aristotle’s views on comedy and denounced as a sorry Byzantine fabrication.”48 The 
Tractate is a four-page document that some claim is an epitome for Aristotle’s lost treatise on 
comedy. The document has a definition for comedy and a few other short passages but mostly 
reads like an outline for a larger work on comedy. Some authors attribute the text to the later 
Peripatetics and others to Theophrastus. Even Cooper, who pays special heed to the Tractate, 
claims that “whatever the authenticity of the Tractate, by far the greater part of an Aristotelian 
theory of comedy is to be found in the Poetics itself.”49 Only Janko attempts to actually 
reconstruct the entirety of the treatise on comedy in Aristotelian language from the Tractate (and 
of course the Poetics).
50
 While this is a very intriguing endeavor, there are two serious points of 
contention that I have with the use of the Tractate. 
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 The first has to do with the opening line of the Tractate. It claims that “poetry is either 
nonmimetic or mimetic.”51 It seems apparent from the Poetics’ opening lines that poίesis is 
mimetic,
52
 even though the topics of history and instruction, which are the nonmimetic poetries 
according to the Tractate, are not really discussed by the Poetics. Indeed, context clues about the 
topic of history seem to indicate that, for Aristotle, history is also a form of mimēsis. Even 
Cooper, who wishes to use the Tractate, notes that “it contradicts one of the central doctrines of 
the Poetics, that a man is a poet only in so far as he is ‘mimetic.’”53 He points out that the extant 
copies of the Poetics and Rhetoric have some internal contradictions and some language that 
postdates Aristotle, so this “contradicting” of one of Poetics central doctrines should not be a 
major concern. However, the “contradictions” in the extant texts are not quite as “glaring” as 
this. Golden claims that “the passages from the Rhetoric and the Poetics are both relevant to, and 
consistent with, each other, and when taken together, provide a persuasive basis for an 
Aristotelian theory of comedy.”54 
 My second point of contention, which is of much greater import, follows Golden’s 
critique of the Tractate’s definition for comedy. Janko’s translation of this definition reads: 
Comedy is an imitation [mίmesis/μίμησις] of an action that is absurd [geloias/γελοίας] 
and lacking in magnitude, complete [with embellished language], the several kinds (of 
embellishment being found) separately in the (several) parts (or the play); (directly 
represented) by person[s] acting, and [not] by means of narration; through pleasure and 
laughter [gelotos/γέλωτος] achieving the purgation [katharsin/καθαρσιν] of the like 
emotions. It has laughter [gelota/γέλωτα] or its mother.55 
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The part that both I and Golden take issue with is the “through pleasure and laughter achieving 
katharsis” section. This is an attempt to parallel what is said about tragedy in the Poetics at 
6.1449b: “Tragedy, then, is an imitation [mimēsis] … through pity and fear effecting the proper 
purgation [katharsin] of these emotions.”56 The first issue is that “pleasure and laughter” do not 
map onto “pity and fear” as polar opposite or reciprocal terms. They are not even categorically 
similar. Pedagogically speaking, Aristotle regularly defines terms through their opposites and 
frequently says that this is obvious, evident, or clear from what has been said before.
57
 That 
which makes us cry is more likely the opposite of laughter, and nowhere does Aristotle claim in 
the Poetics that the intent of tragedy is to make us cry nor is crying its mother. The Tractate 
actually has a definition of tragedy that does not exactly map onto the definition that we find in 
the canonical version of the Poetics, which even Janko points out as problematic.
58
 The Tractate 
claims that pain, grief, or distress (lypēn/λύπην) is the mother of tragedy. Again, it does not seem 
like pain, grief, or distress is the exact opposite of laughter.  
Also, Golden claims that the comic emotions elicited through a proper comedy may or 
may not be “accompanied by laughter.”59 A proper comedy may evoke a smirk or wry smile just 
as readily as a laugh. Further, tragedy is also supposed to elicit pleasurable emotions just like all 
forms of mimēsis. Tragedy is not supposed to evoke serious pain, revulsion, or horror but a 
certain pleasure proper to it. To quote the Poetics “we must not demand of Tragedy any and 
every kind of pleasure, but only that which is proper to it. And since the pleasure which the poet 
should afford is that which comes from pity and fear through imitation [mimēsis], it is evident 
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that this quality must be impressed upon the incidents.”60 Thus, the “pleasure” found in comedy, 
according to the Tractate, does not seem to find its proper opposite in tragedy. Further, it seems 
like Aristotle would have had a more specific “pleasure” to be found from comedy than the 
oddly circular “pleasure from the katharsis of pleasure.” It seems just as odd if not odder that 
laughter is being called an emotion here rather than an activity.  
Aristotle does not purport that laughter is an emotion anywhere in the Rhetoric, which 
would seem like the place for him to discuss it if it were. Seeking a katharsis of laughter, whether 
as relief or intellectual clarification, makes little sense. Even Freud and Spencer, who have a 
relief theory of comedy/laughter, claim that this is a kind of sublimation or transformation of 
other “nervous energies” or emotions into laughter rather than some sort of unleashing of pent up 
laughter. Finally, if we take the purgation model of katharsis seriously here, why would we want 
to use pleasure to purge pleasure or laughter from ourselves? While Aristotle does spend 
considerable time talking about different kinds of pleasure in the Nicomachean Ethics
61
 and of 
the particular pleasures that tragedy can bring in the Poetics, it still seems odd to have comedy’s 
function be to purge one kind of pleasure for another. At best this might equate to some kind of 
pleasure replacement therapy or a sort of croquet of pleasure for the soul. I have never once 
thought or heard anyone say anything to the effect that “I have too much base pleasure going on 
in my life, I think I need to purge or relieve some of that by watching a comedy.” I have 
conversely heard people say that they need to watch a tragedy to get a good cry out or that they 
want to watch a comedy to lift their mood and bring them pleasure when they are lacking it. 
While this is perhaps an anachronistic example or a certain sort of hearsay, this thought still 
resonates. What the Tractate really lacks is the identification of the particular kinds of pleasure 
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associated with comedy or the exact emotions that ought to relate to katharsis in comedy. The 
issue here pertains to “pleasure.” Golden rightly points out that in the Poetics: 
Aristotle tells us (1448b15–17) that we take pleasure in viewing all mimetic 
representations because it turns out that we learn and make inferences from them … As I 
have argued elsewhere, only an interpretation of katharsis as ‘intellectual clarification’ 
can establish a harmony between this term and the telos of mimēsis which Aristotle 
explicitly defines for us in this passage.
62
  
 
Themes internal to the Poetics suggest that Golden is right about katharsis being “intellectual 
clarification” that is pleasurable due to our learning about and viewing excellent imitations of 
various phenomena.
63
 Golden claims that “the essential pleasure of art is an intellectual one 
derived from learning about human existence through the medium of art, it follows that all 
artistic endeavors which achieve the illumination of human experience will be pleasant whether 
their objects are, in reality, pleasant or painful.”64 Thus, there is a pleasure caused by mimēsis 
when the author “gets things right” as it were.65 
 As stated earlier, Jonathan Lear rejects the possibility that the Poetics is about producing 
katharsis as “intellectual clarification.” He claims that trying to educate either the vulgar demos 
or the well-educated elite would be pointless. Lear states “in each case [with either the vulgar or 
the educated audience] the characters of the audience have been formed and ethical education 
would be either futile or superfluous.”66 Aristotle does claim that after a certain point in our 
lifetime our character is mostly formed. However, we might perhaps think of our character like 
gelatin in a mold; once it is set its shape is mostly determined, but that does not mean that 
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alterations cannot still be made to it. Certainly there are limits to what poetry might teach you 
after a certain age, but that does not make it “either futile or superfluous.” This claim denigrates 
all art from a particular society as “futile or superfluous” in educating its people in any way. I 
accept that katharsis may also serve the purpose that Lear lays out in his “relief” theory but that 
is just one function katharsis may have. After some comedies the demos might feel relieved; 
after others, especially politically charged comedies the likes of which were very popular 
amongst the ancient Athenians of this era, the demos might feel agitated, though perhaps more 
clearly focused as to why. Aristophanes, a comic playwright of this era, points out a purpose for 
poetry in his play Frogs, which claims that the plays of these public festivals are instructive 
and/or educational. In the play Frogs when asked what qualities we should admire in the poet, 
the shade of Euripides says “skill and good counsel, and because we make people better 
members of their community.”67 Euripides claims that he educated the demos with this play.68 
The question then becomes whether this education was good or bad. Most scholars seem to agree 
that paideia is the point of these plays. Aristophanes and Plato both seem to agree on this point, 
and earlier evidence from this chapter suggests that Aristotle does too. These plays, at the very 
least, attempt to persuade their audience, according to these ancient Greek authors. 
If we look at the greater context of not just Aristotle and ancient Athens but also the 
whole of the ancient Greek world, we can see a people who believe that the poets are educators 
and the locus of truth. This is why Plato spends so much time with the topic of poets and poetry. 
This is perhaps what motivates Heraclitus of Ephesus to lash out at Homer, Hesiod, and 
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Archilochus in his aphorisms.
69
 This is why Parmenides writes in poetry rather than prose to 
present his philosophy. When a rhapsode would begin the Homeric epics, he would always start 
with the invocation of the muses. He literally invokes the muses to speak through him as though 
he were a mouthpiece for the gods. The standard education for an elite male Athenian in the fifth 
and sixth centuries was to be taught in poetry, a musical instrument, gymnastics, hunting, sports 
of all kinds, military training, moral education and the like. The poetry and musical instrument 
seem striking to some contemporary ears as a primary component of education, rather than just 
some ancillary enrichment. Aristophanes provides great evidence for how much of a standard 
this must have been in his play Wasps, in which a defendant claims that the jurors should take 
pity on him because he is uneducated. The literal way he expresses his ignorance is by saying 
that he does not know how to play the Kithara.
70
 Even if this was meant to be a joke, it would 
seem like the audience would have had to have the shared understanding that musical training 
would be what people might consider being part of a proper education.  
 
1.3. What Aristotle Would Have Said with Righteous Indignation and Confidence 
If the Tractate is wrong about comedy’s emotional objects for katharsis, then what would these 
properly imitated objects be? If we consider what is written in the Poetics about comedy as well 
as look to the Rhetoric for the opposite terms to pair with fear and pity, we can come to what I 
think is a reasonable reconstruction of the lost treatise on comedy. Let us begin by looking at 
Aristotle’s provisional definition of comedy from the Poetics:  
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Comedy is, as we have said, an imitation [mimēsis] of characters of a lower 
[φαῦλος/phaulos] type—not, however, in the full sense of the word bad, the Ludicrous 
[γέλοιον/geloion] being merely a subdivision of the ugly. It consists in some defect or 
ugliness which is not painful or destructive. To take an obvious example, the comic mask 
is ugly and distorted, but does not imply pain.
71
  
 
Comedy then seems to be about characters of this lower, or ignoble (φαῦλος/phaulos) type rather 
than its typical contrast class of the serious/good in the spoudaios. The phaulos character is 
depicted doing ludicrous, absurd, or laughable (γέλοιος/geloios) actions that achieve a katharsis 
from the aroused emotions of indignation (νεμεσᾶν/nemesan) and confidence (θάρσος/tharsos).72  
Golden derives a similar definition but fails to bring in the emotion of confidence or 
tharsos. He relies entirely, on the emotion of indignation or nemesan from the Rhetoric. Golden 
states that “at Rhetoric 1386b9 Aristotle explicitly designates nemesan as the emotion directly 
opposed to pity. Since tragedy and comedy are placed by Aristotle in polar opposition 
concerning the kind of action and character they represent, the identification of nemesan as the 
antonym of pity [is appropriate].”73 The antonym of fear in that same work, however, is 
confidence or tharsos.
74
 Golden’s justification for this comes from Aristotle’s definition of 
nemesan “as the painful feeling that arises because of the occurrence of undeserved good fortune 
… nemesan has the same reverse side as pity, i.e., fear (1387a31–32) [sic 1386b]. He [Aristotle] 
notes that both envy and nemesan become fear when something harmful threatens oneself from 
the good fortune of another.”75 This is not so much a “reverse side” of pity as it is a modification 
of envy or the similar but not equivalent word nemesan. Aristotle’s explicit opposite to fear is 
confidence/tharsos. 
                                                          
71
 Aristotle, Poetics, 5.1449a. 
72
 Compare this definition also with Poetics 13.1452b, where tragedy is defined as “an imitation of actions which 
arouse pity and fear.” 
73
 Golden, “Aristotle on the Pleasure of Comedy,” 381. 
74
 Aristotle, Rhetoric, II.5:1383a–b. 
75
 Golden, “Aristotle on the Pleasure of Comedy,” 382. 
30 
 Aristotle states that from what we know about fear [phobos] it is evident what we know 
about confidence, its objects, and the state of mind of the confident: 
for confidence [tharsos] is opposed [to fear, and what inspires confidence] to what is 
fearful. Thus, hope of safety is accompanied by an imagination that it is near, while 
fearful things either do not exist or are far away … and if antagonists do not exist at all or 
do not have power … [then people are confident]. Or if those with the same interests are 
numerous or stronger or both [people are confident] … And [people become confident] 
when something is not a source of fear to those like them, nor to those [who are] inferior 
and whose superiors they think themselves to be.
76
 
 
Most likely we are not threatened due to this being mimēsis rather than “real life.” Therefore we 
can feel safety from our position and have hope that “things will work out” in comedy, as they 
usually do almost by definition. In opposition to tragedy, comedies traditionally have “happy 
endings,” thus providing its viewers with a sense of hope that inspires confidence. Mikhail 
Bakhtin, while primarily concerned with the medieval French literature, pays special attention to 
the ancient Greek and Roman traditions in his introduction to his eponymous book about 
François Rabelais. In this work, he points out that laughter and moreover premodern comedies 
dispel fear. Bakhtin states “[f]ear is the extreme expression of narrow-minded and stupid 
seriousness, which is defeated by laughter.”77 Our extant evidence supports the fact that there is 
no true fear or terror in the comedies of the ancient Greek world.  
There is also a sense of confidence that arises while watching a comedy because we feel 
strength in numbers due to the laugher of the audience. We may also point out the interesting 
phenomenon that we tend to laugh at things we may not normally find funny due to the 
confidence inspired by numerous people with the same interests laughing or when someone 
“stronger” like a boss or superior laughs at something. This is likely the reason for comedies 
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being filmed in front of a live studio audience or having “laugh tracks” in contemporary 
comedies. The canned laughter attunes one or puts one in a mood more prone to laughing.
78
  
The last line of the above quotation is of special interest since it seems to support one of 
the dominant theories of comedy, namely the superiority theory. Various authors on comedy 
claim that Aristotle and Plato both present a version of the superiority theory of comedy in their 
work. Morreall states that “[a]ccording to the Superiority Theory, represented by selections from 
Plato, Aristotle, and Hobbes, we laugh from feelings of superiority over other people, or over our 
own former position.”79 Comedy, for Aristotle, has to do with a mimēsis of people who are 
phaulos, i.e., lower, ignoble, or inferior to us and thus, who do not threaten us with either serious 
pain or destruction. For Aristotle, confidence would appear to be a required feeling or emotion 
for an appropriately pleasurable comedy. 
 We might now claim that in comedy a properly comic katharsis clarifies or teaches us 
about the feeling or emotion of confidence (tharsos) with regards to us feeling secure, hopeful, 
and, in a sense, superior through our experience of comedy. I cite Golden who claims that 
“comic catharsis is the ‘indignation’ (nemesan) we feel in regard to those incidents of unjustified 
good fortune and those examples of inappropriate … behavior in human existence which do not 
cause pain.”80 Indignation may seem inappropriate to comedy since laughter seems to be inspired 
by a jovial state, which is the opposite of anger.
81
 However, Golden points out examples from 
Aristophanes that may help “clarify” why indignation (even without laughter) is appropriate for 
comedy. Golden claims that:  
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there are a number of places in Aristophanes where indignation, but not laughter, is 
appropriate. We have such a scene in the Clouds (1476–1477) when Strepsiades comes to 
the realization that he made a profound mistake in renouncing the gods and entrusting 
himself to Socrates and goes on to atone for his error by burning down the Phrontisterion 
[Socrates’ School] … Thus it appears that indignation with or without laughter is 
intimately involved in our apprehension of ‘the ridiculous.’82 
 
Golden has a great insight into the comedy of the time, if not comedy in general, because there 
are often “lessons to be learnt” or a “moral to the story” in comedy,83 and those lessons are 
taught through ridicule and clarification of our righteous indignation. We only have to think of 
Plato’s liberal use of irony throughout his dialogues to come to this point. Though we may not 
always burst out laughing at these, and I sometimes do, they provide us with a certain kind of 
pleasure associated with our indignation at some other dramatic character in the dialogue. In 
these cases, a certain level of confidence ought to accompany these feelings of righteous 
indignation. 
 Confidence and indignation about comic characters and their actions is an appropriate 
reconstruction due to its polar parallel in tragedy. According to Aristotle in The Poetics, the 
characters of tragedy are said to be: 
spoudaios (“noble”) while the hero of comedy is the human being who is phaulos 
(“ignoble”) {Poetics 1449a32–33}. We see that spoudaios and phaulos are precise 
antonyms… [and] just as the emotions of pity and fear are appropriate responses to the 
spoudaios hero of tragedy, so nemesan [and tharsos I claim] [are] an appropriate 
response to the phaulos hero of comedy.
84
 
 
Tharsos, as it regards comedy here, is not just a feeling of superiority to the phaulos character 
and his ignoble actions but is also a secure sense of hope for a happy ending. Also the term 
spoudaios is often translated as “serious” rather than “noble” and seriousness is perhaps 
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historically the most juxtaposed term to comedy. There is never anything to fear in comedy so 
long as you are part of its audience and not its target. If Aristotle is correct, then tharsos also 
makes the demos imagine that the hope of safety is nearby.  
In fifth-century Athenian comedy served democratic political purposes. Aristophanes’ 
plays may have tried to inspire confidence in demos sufficient to make them vote to end the 
wars. Lysistrata, Peace, Acharnians, and Birds
85
 are all on the topic of the Peloponnesian War. 
Though these did not inspire enough confidence to end the war, one interpretation of Birds, 
according to Henderson, claims that the plot urges the Athenians to embark on the disastrous 
Sicilian Expedition of 415 BCE. Clouds may have inspired the Athenians to convict Socrates for 
impiety and corrupting the youth. Aristophanes’ play Frogs directs the demos to change the laws 
so that this play can be performed again at the next year’s festival, and it was so wildly popular 
that that is exactly what the demos did. In fact, they even present him with the laurel wreath 
normally given to an Olympic victor.
86
 While comedy can be efficacious, it can also help us to 
imagine a secure and pleasurable telos, even if that telos is fantastic, not actualized, or even 
possible. Comedy frequently involves a lot of fantasy.  
 Fantasy in comedy can come in many forms, but one of the most common is in ignoble 
characters leading lives absorbed in the momentary and bodily pleasures. If we once again 
attempt a parallel and polar understanding of tragedy to comedy in Aristotle’s Poetics, we see 
how well it works with Aristophanes. The consistent use of Aristophanes here is due to his being 
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our only extant author of the era with complete works.
87
 According to Aristotle, the first quality 
of characters in tragedies are that they are supposed to be “good” or “useful” (χρηστὴ/chreste). 
Aristotle says this is possible for women, though difficult to attain, but, in the case of slaves, they 
are inconsequential and cannot be “good.”88 Aristotle alleges that “the second quality demanded 
is that the character be fitting; for there is such a thing as a manly character, but it is not fitting 
for a woman to be manly or clever.”89 In comedy, however, characters such as slaves are clever, 
and women are often portrayed as both manly and clever, such as Lysistrata in her eponymous 
play, Praxagora (literally meaning efficacy in public) from Assemblywomen, and many others. 
According to Aristotle (though certainly not by contemporary standards), women (and slaves) 
should generally be clumped in with other lower, ignoble, or phaulos types of humans, thus 
making them the perfect candidates for characters in comedies. No less than half of 
Aristophanes’ extant plays feature strong female or slave roles. The constraints of “likeness” and 
“consistency” from the Poetics seem as though they could be followed just as well as not 
followed, since characters like Socrates and Dionysus, in Clouds and Frogs respectively, show 
some “likenesses” to their appropriate counterparts, but not faithful likenesses (we at least 
generally assume this for the character of Socrates). Consistency also seems to be of little 
technical importance for comedy, since inconsistency seems to elicit laughter. Inconsistent 
characters would have also likely elicited confident indignation about the phaulos plot or 
character trait or traits. This may be the one character trait that should be the same, as Aristotle 
claims that it is consistent to have a “consistently inconsistent character.” Evidence to the 
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contrary suggests that the characters of comedies often have reversals in positions or dynamic 
changes as part of the climax of the drama (such as Strepsiades coming to his senses in Clouds).  
Once again in comedy we see an often fantastic changing of ways for the better; this is 
the opposite in tragedy, unless you really enjoy the mimēsis of dead bodies.90 Aristotle believes 
that one proper role of mimetic poetry is to teach us about (or to reach a clarifying katharsis 
about) certain important emotions such as fear, pity, confidence and indignation. It can also be 
the relief of emotions as a respite or point of relaxation. This seems to be the lower bar for 
katharsis whereas the higher telos of katharsis should be education or instruction in dramatic 
performances. These four emotional states are great motivators for action, and gaining a clear 
understanding of them is of tantamount importance. It would seem far easier to arouse the 
emotions of fear and pity than those of indignation and confidence in an audience in some 
unifying way.
91
 It also seems that pity and especially fear are greater motivators to action than 
righteous indignation and/or confidence. This may be a reason that historically more time is 
devoted to tragedy than to comedy and perhaps also why Aristotle chooses to address tragedy 
first. 
Further, since comedies of Aristophanes’ era were so overtly socially and politically 
charged, it seems they had more direct influence on their audiences’ actions than tragedy. This is 
likely why they started strictly censoring the plays for political content in 388 BCE after Phillip 
II of Macedon took control of Athens (This had been done to lesser extents during different 
periods of the Peloponnesian War as well). These emotions of confidence and indignation at the 
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ludicrous character make up the core of what would be in Aristotle’s lost treatise on comedy, just 
as much as fear and pity for the unfortunate noble character are at the core of his treatise on 
tragedy. 
 
1.4. Conclusion 
The function of a good comedy or tragedy for Aristotle is less to persuade, though it serves this 
function as well, than to educate or to bring to light a certain issue(s) or person(s), and, in the 
case of comedy, sometimes very specific and powerful people. This bringing to light puts into 
question often unresolved issues in need of decision. Jeffrey Henderson, claims that “the comic 
poets were contributing to debates and divisions of opinion that were yet unresolved.”92 The old 
comedies of ancient Athens, at least in so far as the evidence we have suggests, were very political 
in both the broad and narrow sense of the word. Aristophanes suggests, in his play Frogs, that the 
purpose of the poet/dramatic writer is to instruct and educate the demos. 
Aristotle, however, seems more concerned with how to properly pull off this effect rather 
than with whether it serves “the good” (in a way that seems similar to his stance in the Rhetoric).93 
In the Nicomachean Ethics, he disparages on the idea of there is one good. In Book X of the 
Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle points out that wit and relaxation are but a respite from our serious 
labors, albeit necessary ones, none the less, since excess even in serious work or labor always leads 
to vice and ruination. The way to relax pleasantly, appropriately, and at its best even educationally 
may be what Aristotle is trying to describe or achieve in his Poetics.  
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Chapter 2: This Kant Be Funny: Aesthetics, Beauty, and Comedy 
 
2.1. What about Comedy in Art? 
Scholars since the 1950s have been critiquing the category of aesthetics as myopic in regards to 
the philosophy of art and in some cases even critiquing the very possibility of aesthetic judgment 
itself,
94
 but the problem with aesthetics being the privileged theme of the philosophy of art still 
persists. Strictly speaking, the critical Kant does not want to engage in the a posteriori cultural 
taste of art.
95
 He is only interested in the purely a priori transcendental forms of aesthetic 
judgment, specifically about the beautiful and the sublime. And so my account may in fact be a 
glancing blow to a purely Kantian critique, but it does not exonerate the Kantians and neo-
Kantians that turned theories of beauty into theories of art, or the privileging of aesthetic 
judgments above all else in the realm of the philosophy of art. Nor does it come close to properly 
dealing with the art form that is comedy. 
 Comedy, for being a very popular art form, has received very little scholarly attention 
until very recently. While many scholars have tersely addressed the topic, serious attention was 
not paid to the topic until the turn of the twentieth century by Bergson and Freud in their works 
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Laughter (1900) and Jokes and Their Relation to the Unconscious (1905) respectively.
96
 There is 
another serious lapse in the attention given to the topic of comedy, likely due to two world 
wars.
97
 As of late there has been a blossoming of works on comedy especially in the field of 
continental philosophy.
98
 This blossoming is likely due to the movement away from Kantian and 
neo-Kantian theories of aesthetics and perhaps toward something more akin to a postmodern 
perspective.
99
 
Theories of art have most often been theories of the beautiful. The last three centuries 
while focused on aesthetics have also had those that fought against it from Hegel to Heidegger. 
None the less, beauty and more so aesthetic judgment maintained the majority share in the field 
of the philosophy of art. It is worth noting that this is likely the reason that comedy has been 
neglected for so long. Since Plato and especially Aristotle, Western philosophers have contrasted 
serious, noble, good actions and faces, the spoudaios in tragedy with the ignoble, ugly or base 
actions and faces, the phaulos in comedy.
100
 This is practically the difference between a tragedy 
that we might call beautiful and a comedy that would never be called spoudaios/serious or 
kalos/beautiful by these philosophers. Comedy pertained to geloias which roughly translates to 
the adjective for laughable, amusing, mirth-provoking or absurd. Both Plato and Aristotle 
frequently used the word to mean absurd, and many translators almost exclusively translate the 
word this way in their works.  
                                                          
96
 The Earl of Shaftsbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper) also had a short treatise on comedy entitled Sensus Communis: 
An Essay on the Freedom of Wit and Humour from 1709, where he first started using the term “humor” to mean 
something “funny” rather than the medical term for the humors of the body. 
97
 This will be addressed further in chapter 3 of this dissertation. 
98
 Bernard Freydberg, “Recent Continental Philosophy and Comedy: Comic Overflow,” Philosophy Compass 5, no. 
7 (2010): 516–524. 
99
 The postmodern claim will be partially addressed in chapter 3 and a bit more in chapter 4 of this dissertation. 
Also, see Iain Thomson, Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
100
 Aristotle, Poetics with the Tractatus Coislinianus, Reconstruction of the Poetics II, and the Fragments of the On 
Poets, trans. Richard Janko (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1987), 1449a32–33. 
39 
Comedy, which is standardly neither beautiful nor sublime, sits awkwardly positioned in 
its relation to aesthetics. In this chapter I will present a reductio ad absurdum argument of sorts 
to complicate the position of the relation between aesthetics and the beautiful. This argument is 
explicates equipollent evidence within aesthetics in its relation to comedy. This will bring us to 
examine some critical issues involving the subject/object divide inherent in problematic accounts 
of aesthetic experience, or, perhaps in the notion of the aesthetic itself. Then I will examine the 
Kantian understanding of aesthetics and why comedy is so poorly positioned to be part of his 
transcendental project. Finally, I will critique the best contemporary argument in favor of an 
aesthetics of humor produced by John Morreall.
101
 Aesthetics, with its focus on beauty, is a poor 
concept for assessing comedy, which has led to its neglect in the field of the philosophy of art. If 
we understand why this is the case, we can move beyond this sort of analysis, and assess comedy 
in a more fruitful way. If we are going to properly understand comedy and its efficacy in relation 
to aesthetics, a look at the history of aesthetics and its relation to comedy is in order. It is in 
examining the roots and genealogy of this concept then we can see how it is either systematically 
excluded or oddly intertwined. 
This chapter assesses the shortcomings of aesthetics from a comedic lens. I will assess 
why comedy is so often left outside of the aesthetic framework and why attempts at bringing it 
into the fold particularly by John Morreall have been less than successful. Part of the reason for 
using comedy as an interpretive lens banks on a near constant tradition of focusing on beauty and 
as such order, form, proportion, and purposiveness. In comedy, since at least the time of 
Aristotle, it has been about the ugly or the shameful (phaulos), as well as, a constant 
transgression of order, form, proportion, laws, norms, and customs, and often having a focus on 
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the absurd or ridiculous. The progenitors of aesthetics in the 1700s such as the Earl of 
Shaftesbury (Anthony Ashley Cooper) and Kant want to point to evidence of intelligent design 
and thus God through the pleasure found in beauty and our natural inclination to seek it out. 
Kant, as always, does not go so far as to directly claim intelligent design or God, but does point 
toward it. Nietzsche may have most accurately described Kant when he called him a “sneaky 
Christian.” Kant always “rides the fence” on this issue, but certainly leans in this direction. One 
could claim, comically, that our want for and pleasure found in the lack of proportion, in the 
transgressing of order and law, and other general absurdities gives us good evidence of 
unintelligent design and thus that there is no God. Perhaps that is why we love comedy and 
laughing so much, and that furthermore we seek it out even at great cost to ourselves (as an 
inappropriate joke or insult can be very costly, and an inappropriate laugh at another can be as 
well). This evidence seems equipollent to me and should thus produce a proper a poria or a 
reductio ad absurdum of sorts. This argument will not push the theories of beauty to their 
extreme limit, but will push the arguments and evidence in the opposite direction to show its 
equipollent and aporetic end in comedy using the same aesthetic rules. 
 
2.2. Unintelligent Design and Alterity 
The aesthetic in its very roots is about certain orders and proportions that assume a standard of 
beauty, that does not exist for the comic in a certain sense. Mikhail Bakhtin’s Rabelais and His 
World points out the excessive superlative style that often appears in comic works.
102
 Comic 
proportions are the anti-proportions, but do not depend on proportion as a binary. The comic 
excessiveness is a matter of alterity that need not be binary. When things lack order or proper 
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proportion they can be comic, laughable, absurd, or geloios/γέλοιος. It is not that they need be 
actual reciprocals or opposites; they just need some alterity or difference; Bakhtin claims that 
there are “[n]o clearly defined boundaries … [it is all] blended with the world.”“103 Perhaps the 
comic perception of the lack of order, proportion, or purposiveness is akin to Bergson’s 
“gesture” instead of “action” found in his Laughter, i.e., that “actions” are intentional, purposive 
and consciously willed and that comedy is banked on “gesture,” which is unconscious, 
unintentional and mechanistic rather than “willed.”104 There seems to be a lack of design behind 
those “gestures” we find comic.  
If there are arguments for intelligent design due to our aesthetic judgment of the beautiful 
can we make arguments for unintelligent design because of comedy and laughter? Is not the 
laughter of man proof that there is no divine intelligence? There is as much “proof” in the last 
sentence as there is in the intuitions we have to see order in everything. Perhaps it is as the 
anthropologist and scientist say that we tend to see order everywhere due to its utility for 
survival, but perhaps true or ultimate order does not exist.
105
 Humans love to categorize and find 
patterns and/or order, but whenever we create a final category, concept, or order, something like 
the platypus shows up. We can see other examples of this in the wave/particle duality of light or 
the total reevaluation of taxonomy of living organisms favoring genetics over the phenotypic 
categorizations of yesteryear. These breaks often occur in our seemingly well-ordered 
distinctions. Apparently there is no such thing as fish.
106
 The category of fish is so broad that 
some organisms we call fish are so genetically disparate that a human and a rhino are closer in 
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genetic relation. But alas, we have traditionally spent far more time working on beauty and the 
order of things than the comic, laughable, and absurd disorder of things.  
Nietzsche may be right that this focus is due to a desire for logic, calmness, tranquility, 
and hope, things of concern to both Epicureans and Christians.
107
 This may relate to “freedom 
from” (negative freedom) order and proportion in the comic and a “freedom for” (positive 
freedom) imaginative novel creation (as most people do not care for stale jokes/punchlines. An 
example of this is when going to a music concert people tend to want to hear the songs they have 
already heard regularly, but at a comedy special people tend to want to hear new material rather 
than the old).
108
 The comic is precisely where we can transgress our ordinary borders, limits, 
orders, proportions, norms, and sacred concepts. For Kant, the beautiful is a “relation between 
our cognitive faculties and the formal qualities of objects … [a]lthough it is only subjective, the 
purposiveness exhibited by natural beauty in particular may be interpreted as a sign that nature is 
hospitable to our moral interests (5:300).”109 We might equally take the “relation” that we find in 
a comic context (though not subjective nor objective) as sign or anti-sign, if you will, that nature 
is hospitable to amorality.  
In a Bakhtinian sense, comedy seems to be extramoral or amoral and finds itself in a 
context that is festive, “a second life,” or a “second order.”110 We might call this “second order” 
of life not an order at all but perhaps an alterity. During festive times like Carnival or Mardi Gras 
and the like he did not polarize the position people were in when engaging in these comedic 
spectacles; he claimed that they were “on the borderline between life and art, in a peculiar 
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midzone as it were.”111 Art and life are not generally juxtaposed as opposites and in this comedic 
carnivalesque; we do not juxtapose order and disorder in a merely dualistic framework.  
Comedy need not have a binary or opposite a priori. It also need not be a priori different, 
opposite or incongruent. Absurdity and disproportion are not a priori categories nor is 
incongruity, which itself relies on congruity. Alterity is merely difference in a nondualistic frame 
of reference or context. All a posteriori contexts are rooted in the material culture of a social 
body. Alterity itself is not a priori ‘funny’ either;” once again, context is the difference. A 
context for comedy must be shared in an a posteriori way for it to come off as comedic, and, 
perhaps, shared by more than one person. When someone laughs at something that no one 
around them finds comic he or she looks foolish, and someone who laughs alone is viewed with 
suspicion and sometimes is thought to be mad. That the comedic occurs a posteriori may be the 
reason that Kant spends so little time on it in the Critique of Judgment.  
 
2.3. Kant on Comedy 
In Kant’s defense, the beautiful in its “purposive purposelessness that looks arranged by a will 
but need not be” is not the opposite of the ugly or comic. The ugly or comic are not set up in that 
manner, because they look unpurposive or purposively unarranged. Both Plato and Aristotle 
appear to fall short in their purported descriptions of comedy because they attempt to define what 
comedy or the laughable ought to be rather than how it is. Plato in his dialogue the Philebus (48–
50) defines the laughable or comedic as more or less a mockery of those who do not know 
themselves well; this is a sort of insult humor similar to the Hobbesian superiority theory. 
Aristotle, on the other hand, purports that this lowbrow insult humor is the vice of being 
buffoonish rather than the virtue of wit or eutrapelos (i.e., well turning in the ancient Greek, or a 
                                                          
111
 Bakhtin, Rabelais and His World, 8. 
44 
certain sort of versatility with language). These assessments of the comedic fall short because 
comedy can be comprised of many other components, and, though at its best it can be civilized 
and refined, comedy simply does not need to be either. It can be uncouth, unsubtle, and 
malicious, and oftentimes is. 
Kant does not attempt a system of opposites or binaries when it comes to beauty, but he 
still divides the world in two: the subjective and objective, though beauty happens in the relation 
between the two. When Kant does actually address comedy and laughter, he does so in the very 
last section of division 1, section 54 of the Critique of Judgment, which is simply entitled 
“Comments.”  
Kant noticed that comedy and laughter did not quite fit in his Third Critique, since he 
could not quite place comedy into either the category of the sublime or the beautiful. He clumps 
it together with games of chance, i.e., gaming or gambling and the play of tone or color.
112
 These 
things merely gratify and are good for bodily health, i.e., are individual and particular to a 
specific body as not everyone likes the same music, colors, or jokes. Those things are gratifying 
according to Kant because of the individual’s particular composure, and they therefore are not a 
priori and thus not part of his transcendental project. Further, he relegates all of these merely 
gratifying goods for bodily health in a very dualistic manner. To quote Kant at some length: 
the quickening [due to laughter or music] is merely bodily, even though it is aroused by 
ideas of the mind, and shows that all the gratification {we find} at a lively party, extolled 
as being so refined and inspired, consists in the feeling of health that is produced by an 
intestinal agitation corresponding to such play. It is not our judging of the harmony we 
find in tones or in flashes of wit—this harmony, with its beauty, merely serves as a 
necessary vehicle—but the furtherance of the vital processes in the body, the affect that 
agitates the intestines and the diaphragm, in a word the feeling of health (which we 
cannot feel without such prompting), which constitutes the gratification we find in the 
fact that we can reach the body through the soul as well, and use the soul as the physician 
of the body.
113
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This brings laughter and music into a merely physical realm (i.e., the body), but also implies an 
odd dualism at the very end of this passage. We find Kant falling into a dualistic framework of 
mind/soul and body. That the mind/soul can be the “physician of the body” harkens back to the 
problems of dualism that we have faced since the Modern Era. 
If mind/soul and body are separate, how do they interact or influence each other? On this 
point Kant does not provide any more explanation. The closest he comes in attempting to explain 
what is taking place here is when he claims that the mind and body have a “reciprocal effect … 
which produces in the body an equilibrium of the vital forces.”114 This still does not adequately 
explain how they interact though, and also there is no explanation of these “vital forces” save for 
them being good for one’s health. 
 The “merely gratifying” is for the most part left out of not only the scope of the critiques 
but out of most neo-Kantian philosophy. The “merely gratifying” must come from subjective 
sensation but should not relate to an a posteriori communal understanding or context if it is to be 
within the scope of aesthetics. Without shared a posteriori communal understanding, the comedic 
would likely not exist or even be explicable. Alterity from shared communal understanding or 
what I am calling a shared context seems at its root difference but perhaps not, strictly speaking, 
incongruity. 
By context I mean something structurally similar to Heidegger’s concept of world.115 
There is always a context in which we are engaged. Noёl Carroll, while not a Heideggerian and 
not attempting to adapt Heidegger’s concept of “world,” still makes a point that can be clearly 
beneficial in explicating what I mean by context when he states: 
In order for comic amusement to take hold, it requires a background of shared 
presuppositions…about norms (of intelligence, ethics, and even personal hygiene). When 
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we laugh together, we are in effect acknowledging our membership in a community … In 
this context, our converging laughter serves as a signal to each and all of us that we are 
bound together by shared assumptions … Although we say that we get the joke, it might 
be more accurate to say that the joke gets us.
116
 
 
The context of an artwork solicits us. The context tries to contextualize us, it tries to incorporate 
us as part of the context. We are a part, not in an individuated sense, but in the sense of being 
part of a whole context like a piece of equipment, in the Heideggerian sense. There is no such 
thing as “an equipment.” There are only pieces of equipment and parts of a context, because 
equipment like a context or world by its nature entails that there are other parts or pieces that are 
implied by what it is. It must be part of a whole.
117
  
This context seems to start off as analogue with no strict distinctions between pieces, or 
rather no pieces at all. The digital is exact small pieces of things. It is rather like the difference 
between vinyl records and mp3s in music. Records have a smoother quality (when not scratched) 
than mp3s recordings or other digital music that just has a coarser feel to it. Analogue clocks 
move smoothly; digital clocks jump. What Heidegger would call a ready-to-hand world that is 
one unified phenomenon is an analogue world. It is only later and secondarily the digital piece 
meal one might call present-at-hand. once we try to parse out how the comedy “works” for us as 
individuals. It is here again that comedy highlights this subject/object divide. One smoothly 
understands comedy in one’s context or world until we are asked to examine it or why we do not 
recognize something is supposed to be comedic. It is when we seem unware of the comedic 
element that we suffer a breakdown and the comedic work becomes present-at-hand to us.
118
 
Then and only then does it breakdown into its component digital parts. Oddly, this is when the 
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comedic is least humorous. When you have to explain why something is humorous it generally 
no longer is; it ceases to work. 
When we are unaware of the context of an artwork it still solicits us, but it solicits us in 
silence. It still tries to speak; we just do not hear it. The more disinterested, the more devoid of 
content, the more “free” and “pure” a judgment, the more strictly speaking is the artwork severed 
from the context that gives it meaning. By doing this one is splitting the context in twain between 
the subjective and the objective leaving only this tether of a relation between the two for said 
aesthetic judgment to exist. The subjectivity of the aesthetic judgment further entrenches dubious 
dualisms such as the subject/object divide and dualism writ large.  
For Kant, the aesthetic judgment of beauty is supposed to be one of subjective 
universality.
119
 Kant claims that: 
a judgment of taste is to have subjective universal communicability without presupposing 
a determinate concept; hence this subjective universal communicability can be nothing 
but [that of] the mental state in which we are when imagination and understanding are in 
free play (insofar as they harmonize with each other as required for cognition in 
general).
120
  
 
These judgments must be a mental state, i.e., that everyone ought to universally experience due 
to their understanding and imagination being engaged in a sort of “free play.” I find it very 
difficult to believe that we all share the same faculty for understanding, but let us put that aside 
and allow everyone’s understanding to be a transcendental faculty. I find it hard if not impossible 
to believe that we could all share imagination in a universal way. Our imagination is likely only 
an odd composite of all of the things we have been exposed to and seems to be relative to the 
context or world that we are a part of. On the other hand for Kant, the imagination does a lot of 
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heavy lifting in his critiques, but he is never quite explicit about what it actually is. Kant 
basically claims that the imagination is just one of the great mysteries of the soul.
121
  
What is more is that it is also an odd metric for judgment when it comes to the beautiful. 
It seems according to Kant that the longer the imagination and understanding “tarry” in free play 
the more beautiful the object of judgment is. This free play, while necessarily rooted in the body 
and sensation due to the necessity of our own observation, is in a “sense” left out of our proper 
aesthetic judgments when it comes to the beautiful and in fine art. It appears that sensation is 
immediate and does not allow for this metric to take place in a significant way. Kant claims 
“Fine art … is a way of presenting that is purposive on its own and that furthers, even though 
without a purpose, the culture of our mental powers to {facilitate} social communication … 
aesthetic art that is also fine art is one whose standard is the reflective power of judgment, rather 
than sensation proper.”122 So sensation proper is not what fine art is about and this once again 
takes us further away from the groundedness in the body that must come with all aesthetics 
judgments. He continues to entrench this dualism when he claims that fine art is about “form that 
is purposive … rather than the matter of sensation (i.e., charm or emotion). For the pleasure we 
take in purposive form is also culture, and it attunes the spirit to ideas.”123 How exactly this 
aesthetic judgment “attunes the spirit/mind” over and against sensation, charm, and emotion is 
again hard to explain.
124
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It appears that only nature and the “fine arts” are properly worthy of the kind of 
transcendental reflective judgment that Kant is seeking in the Third Critique. As was stated 
earlier these fine arts are not focused on the agreeable in sensation, but rather on the a priori 
formal qualities that accompany presentation. It is important to note here that the very idea of 
fine (schön) arts does not really exist prior to this era. The term “fine” or “schön” in German is 
etymologically very close to the word for “beauty” or “Schöne.” This alone is genealogically 
interesting as it demarcates the region of the fine arts to exclude anything we may not consider 
beautiful, thus eliminating comedy and specifically theatrical comedy, as a proper object of 
judgment. Kant does include theatrical tragedy as a proper fine art in it being the pictorial/visual 
plus oral/speech in art, but makes no mention of theatrical comedy that shares the same 
qualities.
125
 
Kant does not coin the term “fine arts,” but through his philosophy he greatly bolsters the 
idea that this category exists and is of great importance. The ancient Greeks did not even have a 
work for “art” the way we do and in the way we use it, as was mentioned in the previous chapter. 
Kant claims that art that is not “fine” or at least connected in some way with morality will “serve 
in that case only for our diversion, which we need all the more in proportion as we use it to 
dispel the mind’s dissatisfaction with itself, with the result that we increase still further our 
uselessness and dissatisfaction with ourselves.”126 So it seems that art that is not “fine” serves 
only as a diversion or distraction that is not meaningful, or useful (except perhaps for our bodily 
health). 
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When Kant orders the “fine arts” he places music as the lowest among the fine arts “since 
it merely plays with sensations.”127 By contrast, poetry holds the highest rank as “[i]t owes its 
origin almost entirely to genius and is least open to guidance by precept or examples.”128 For our 
current enquiry we must leave aside the topic of genius, but this elevation of poetry to the highest 
rank among the fine arts is also due to its lack of a posteriori “guidance” and in its pleasure being 
found in its a priori presentations. This seems troubling, due to poetry’s reliance on a posteriori 
concepts. Certainly, some of its concepts are indeed a priori, but generally speaking many more 
are historically and culturally contingent and indebted to an a posteriori context.  
Drama, and particularly Tragedy, do seem to hold a high rank ordering in Kant’s 
judgment of the fine arts, but it seems to lack an appreciation for comedy as a form. This may be 
because Kant like many Western critics considers Tragedy to be universal in its form, whereas 
comedy is not. This however, does not hold up under closer scrutiny. A classic Anthropology 
article entitled “Shakespeare in the Bush” depicts an anthropologist who had been observing a 
West African indigenous tribe.
129
 The English anthropologist had assumed that the great 
tragedies of the West, in this case particularly Hamlet, would be universally understood and 
appreciated. As it turned out the story had to be changed and edited by the tribe’s elders such that 
the tribal audience could understand it, which in turn changed it into an almost unrecognizable 
story for a Western European audience. As it turned out Hamlet was the villain and his uncle the 
“tragic” hero. While, the privileged theme of death in the Tragedy may be considered universal, 
so may humor and laughter in comedy, both require an a posteriori context to work. 
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This distinction of Kant’s is not unlike that between perfect and imperfect duties in his 
moral theory. Kant claims our moral duty “not to steal” is tied to our a priori concept of 
“property,” which is necessary for a civil society, but our imperfect duty to “philanthropy” does 
not necessarily have to hold for all civilized societies; it just harmonizes better if we do. Both 
Hegel and Marx point out here that we could actually do away with the a priori concept of 
property and thus eliminate our duty to not steal since this would be a logical impossibility. In 
some indigenous tribes in North America the concept of property is very “loose” or different if at 
all the same concept. Chairman Mao was famed for his statement “property is theft,” i.e., that if 
everyone owns everything as a community keeping something for oneself is stealing from the 
whole and thus a very different, understanding than Kant’s. This shows that Kant’s “perfect” 
duties actually turn out to be at most “imperfect” if we divorce them from his ethnocentric 
eighteenth-century German culture. 
 A posteriori concepts often bleed into Kant’s “pure” aesthetic judgments even in the 
ways he defines them. These judgments about, and categorizations of art serve to denigrate the 
place of the body in aesthetic judgment. If the Heideggerian understanding of “world” is accurate 
proximally and for the most part there is no mind/body or subject/object divide most of the time 
and that these distinctions draw us further away from a meaningful understanding of our context 
or “world.” The coup de grâce of sorts on all of this is that the “agreeable” or “sensate” amounts 
to nothing; that nothing is learned or gained, and nothing from these “other arts” leads us to 
ruminate, meditate, or take a stand on anything. They are in a “sense” lacking the efficacy to take 
responsibility for our past, present, or future. Kant states:  
Agreeable arts are those whose purpose is merely enjoyment. They include [the art of 
providing] all those charms that can gratify a party at table, such as telling stories 
entertainingly, animating the group to open and lively conversation, or using jest and 
laughter to induce a certain cheerful tone among them—a tone such that, as is said, there 
52 
may be a lot of loose talk over the feast, and no one wants to be held responsible for what 
he says, because the whole point is the entertainment of the moment, not any material for 
future meditation or quotation.
130
 
 
While this may often be the case, it need not always be the case. Jest and “loose talk” may in fact 
bring many repercussions. Often things said in jest are our actual beliefs or are made to make one 
think about our actual beliefs and perhaps modify them. Putting this aside we might also point 
out that when Kant does mention laughter and humor, he does not bring up comedy as a dramatic 
form, but rather the form of joking or storytelling, which are not the same. Morreall states that 
Kant, Schopenhauer and Freud all explain comedy, humor and laughter by primarily using 
fictional jokes for examples.
131
 Further, we may indeed be held responsible for our “loose talk” 
especially if we are in the public eye. Sometimes we should be held accountable or responsible 
for such talk, and sometimes not, but there is no facile way of determining this aside from a deep 
understanding of the context from which it came. 
 There is an understanding in Kant’s Critique of Judgment that gaming, music, and 
comedic acts may be agreeable and health-promoting but are nonetheless merely bodily 
gratification set over and against some sort of superior judgment that comes solely from one’s 
mind or soul and thus categorically differentiates it as transcendentally worthy of our intense 
philosophical scrutiny. Kant claims: 
music and something to laugh about are two kinds of play with aesthetic ideas, or for that 
matter with presentations of the understanding, by which in the end nothing is thought; it 
is merely change they involve that still enables them to gratify us in a lively way … that 
they amount to an inner motion that seems to further all the vital processes in the body, as 
is proved by how sprightly the mind becomes as a result, even though nothing has been 
won or learned.
132
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This quote suggests how little Kant cares for these topics. While music may be salvaged and 
supplant the other arts in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of art as the supreme art form, comedy 
does not receive such a restoration. Many philosophers will tout the greatness of music, but few 
will spare more than a few scant pages for inquiry into comedy as an art form. Kant is considered 
one of the progenitors of the most prominent philosophical theory on comedy in our 
contemporary context. He is famed for bringing to light the incongruity theory of comedy, in 
which he states, “[w]hatever is to arouse lively, convulsive laughter must contain something 
absurd (hence something that the understanding cannot like for its own sake). Laughter is an 
affect that arises if a tense expectation is transformed into nothing.”133 Thus, an incongruity that 
we perceive to be absurd builds up and is then released into nothing. This is in a sense the format 
of most jokes, i.e., set-up … punchline. 
John Morreall is perhaps the best contemporary defender of an aesthetic understanding of 
comedy. For the most part, Morreall maintains that this judgment is one of what he calls “comic 
amusement” and as such his interpretation is a variation of the incongruity theory of comedy.134 
 
2.4. Let’s Get Morreall about Comedy 
Comic amusement seems to be the focus of most contemporary philosophers in their attempt to 
understand the comedic.
135
 Definitions of comedy, humor, and laughter have always been 
difficult to wrangle, but the current predominant theory bears resemblance to Kant’s incongruity 
theory. 
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 This theory roughly holds that some sort of perceived incongruity can give rise to comic 
amusement, which often, though not necessarily, leads to laughter (or sometimes just a snicker, 
smile, mirth, or levity). There are numerous variations to this definition. One of the first is the 
above definition given by Kant claiming that a tense expectation is transformed into a harmless 
nothing. We perceive a building up of tension followed by a punchline in incongruity, which is 
harmless or not offensive in any “serious” way. For instance, one of the easiest jokes to illustrate 
this, though not a very funny one, is this: two men walk into a bar, the third one ducks. The idea 
is that we are waiting for more narrative when we start the joke “two men walk into a bar” since 
many jokes start this way, but this joke conflates two meanings of the term “bar” to show an 
incongruity in language that is harmless and perhaps comically amusing so long as we know 
both meanings of the term “bar” (i.e., a place to get a drink and a pole that one may run into). 
In fairness to both Kant and Morreall, it is important to note that Kant while being an 
important contributor to the incongruity theory of comedy, never intended for it to be an 
aesthetic judgment of comic amusement, and Morreall, while producing the most contemporary 
version of aesthetic interpretation of comic amusement, claims that his theory is different from 
the incongruity theory.
136
 Essentially, his “new theory of laughter,” which includes comedy and 
humor as well as noncomedic/humorous occurrences of laughter involves a sudden pleasant 
psychological/cognitive shift.
137
 With that said, I suggest that his “sudden pleasant psychological 
shift” is analogous to Kant’s “tense expectation transformed into nothing” and a more nuanced 
version of the incongruity theory. 
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Morreall asserts that “amusement is idle … [and] in this respect, amusement is like the 
aesthetic enjoyment of music or fine art, which is a paradigm of disinterested pleasure.”138 The 
problem here is that the comedic need not be “mere amusement.” While the terminology “mere 
amusement” “feels right” when describing risible happenings, it is too colloquial and myopic for 
covering the comedic writ large the whole category of “disinterested” or “disengaged” 
liking/delight is itself dubious as Nietzsche points out in the third essay of On the Genealogy of 
Morals in section 6. There he points out that all “aesthetic appreciation” is not disinterested in 
happiness, as a sort of Epicurean or Romantic calmness, tranquility, or ataraxia that we may 
liken to the momentary stilling of the flaming wheel of Ixion.
139
 
To quote Morreall at some length on his aesthetic interpretation of comedy or humorous 
and laughable: 
A central idea in aesthetics is aesthetic experience. While philosophers have 
characterized it in different ways, there is general agreement that it is a kind of 
appreciation in which we perceive or contemplate something for the satisfaction of the 
experience itself, not in order to achieve something else. Starting in the early eighteenth 
century, with Anthony Ashely Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury; Francis Hutheson; and 
Joseph Addison, the lack of self-concern and personal advantage in aesthetic experience 
was called ‘disinterestedness.’ Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790) is the best known 
account of it. Having an aesthetic interest in something is contrasted with having a 
practical interest or cognitive interest in it … someone enjoying the sculpture 
aesthetically attends to the way it looks and feels, rather than to any practical or cognitive 
gain it promises. This idea of attending to something for the pleasure of the experience, 
rather than to gain knowledge or reach a goal, applies to humorous amusement, too. We 
are not amused in order to achieve anything. Without cognitive and practical concerns, 
we simply enjoy the looking, listening and thinking. Theorists of both humor and art have 
spoken of ‘distance’ in the way I have spoken of disengagement.140 
 
While most of this material has already been addressed, it is important to lay out exactly what the 
aesthetic understanding of the comedic is, which will succinctly sum up what Morreall states on 
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the subject. Once again, it first divests the comedic from having any self-concern or interest 
either practical or cognitive and is solely for the experience of pleasure and amusement. We have 
already attended to why amusement might be problematic and why it essentially presupposes the 
exclusion of the attainment of knowledge, a goal, or achievement of anything substantive. I 
remain unconvinced of the possibility of “pure distance/disengagement.” 
Art becomes petty pleasure when judged solely as a “purely” aesthetic experience. When 
viewed as petty pleasure it becomes easily ignored and rightfully so if this is all the philosophy 
of art amounts to. Nietzsche addresses this when he refers to the category of art that he calls 
Romantic in the Gay Science in his 1886 second preface, section 4, and 1886 addendum in Book 
V, aphorism 370. The roots of this can still be found in the original 1882 edition of the Gay 
Science in aphorism 86, Of the Theatre.
141
 This is also in a sense the death of art that both Hegel 
and Heidegger point out. Heidegger especially brings to the fore the problems inherent in any 
aesthetic interpretation of artworks. Unfortunately, he too neglects the role of comedy as possible 
“great artworks” or what in the West we have referred to as the “fine arts” for roughly the last 
three hundred or so years. Nonetheless, we will now venture to adumbrate what a Heideggerian 
interpretation of comedy might look like. 
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Chapter 3: Heidegger’s Neglect of Comedy, but a Heideggerian Interpretation of Comedy 
Nonetheless 
 
3.1. The Forgetting of Comedy 
Drama, as an art form, has occupied a central role in the philosophy of art
142
 since the time of 
Aristotle. With the exception of painting, no other art form is used as often as an example for 
explication of theory in philosophy. Heidegger briefly treats tragedy in his canonical essay “The 
Origin of the Work of Art” (OWA) when he speaks of Antigone,143 but he fails to even mention 
comedy.
144
 Yet, the comedy of fifth- and sixth-century Athens deserves attention in the 
philosophy of art. In any case, as a contemporary art form, comedy has taken root as the 
preeminent genre in the US and, as such, also deserves to be discussed. Heidegger attempts to 
transcend the aesthetic explanation for art in his OWA. He claims (among other things) that 
“great art” needs to be truth-disclosing and world-creating.145  
This kind of world-creating/orienting art, which Nietzsche hinted at, provides a much 
better account of how truly great art functions and how it is related to our very being. When art is 
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treated as merely aesthetic, it loses its vital force and becomes something of a passing pleasure or 
amusement of mere sensuous subjective experience (which incidentally is where most 
philosophers have placed all comedy all along). This chapter aims to show that comedy can be 
the “great art” that Heidegger describes with the ability to produce a happening of truth. To this 
end, I would like to call that kind of comedy true comedy. True comedy, no less than tragedy, 
can transform speech by making us take a stand on meaningful decisions in our historical 
community. When comedy falls short of being true comedy, it can still provide “one” with an 
excellent phenomenological example of the existential mode of being that Heidegger calls 
“falling” in Being and Time. To this end, I would like to call this kind of comedy fallen comedy. 
Throughout this chapter a phenomenological interpretation of comedy will be used to concretely 
explicate some features of Heidegger’s philosophy. 
Authors such as Nietzsche and Gadamer use ancient Greek drama as the focal point of 
their analyses of art but do little justice to comedy in them.
146
 Nietzsche’s Birth of Tragedy, as 
the title might suggest, has precious few passages about comedy in it.
147
 Gadamer, in his Truth 
and Method, uses play (spiel) and eventually theatrical plays as a structured form of this play to 
help explicate his theory of art, which deals with the play in the play’s representation or 
presentation. However, again very little is said about comedy.
148
 For Nietzsche and Gadamer, 
comedy mostly shows up in their works as tragedy’s tag-along mentioned only in the same 
breath as tragedy. For example, Gadamer repeatedly speaks of the “tragedy and comedy of 
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life”149 but does not go on to explicate anything else about comedy. Nietzsche speaks about the 
historic roots of tragedy in the comic satyr-plays and also claims that the comic, along with the 
sublime, helps to discharge the “nausea of absurdity”150 of life. This nausea comes when we 
discover the vacuum and horror of existence.  
In the Birth of Tragedy (BoT), this nihilistic wisdom is revealed by the satyr Silenus to 
King Midas. According to Silenus, what was best in life was “utterly beyond your reach: not to 
be born, not to be, to be nothing. But the second best for you is—to die soon.”151 While 
Nietzsche does not go into details about the need for the comic here, we might see why one 
would need some comedy after that news. It is here in the BoT that we can see what might have 
lead Heidegger (among others) to ignore the role of comedy in art.
152
 Nietzsche famously claims 
that Euripides and New Attic Comedy killed, or at least degenerated, the “good” tragedy of 
Ancient Athens. He claims that with their advent the Greeks had given up: 
not only his [the ancient Greek’s] belief in an ideal past, but also his belief in an ideal 
future … The passing moment, wit, levity, and caprice are its highest deities; the fifth 
estate, that of the slaves, now comes to power, at least in sentiment … [the focus of 
drama becomes] the slave who has nothing of consequence to be responsible for, nothing 
great to strive for, and who does not value anything in the past or future higher than the 
present.
153
  
 
It is all too often forgotten that Nietzsche places the blame for the ruination of tragedy with 
Menander and New Attic Comedy, not just Euripides. Heidegger was greatly influenced by 
Nietzsche and wrote more about him than any other figure and this, coupled with the 
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aforementioned quote, should help us start to understand why Heidegger neglects comedy, 
unjustifiably in my view. 
It is true, of course, that Heidegger lived during the part of the twentieth century in which 
the senseless slaughter of World War I was a raw and a recent memory, and a war that was 
followed by yet another world war. The twentieth century was punctuated throughout with 
countless genocides, and from the midcentury point onward featured the imminent threat of 
worldwide nuclear apocalypse. Adorno once famously said, we cannot have poetry after 
Auschwitz. We can only assume that goes double for comedy. It seems comedy especially 
should not exist after Auschwitz and that there can be no laughter either.
154
 Though this was said 
in 1951, which postdates some of the writings of Heidegger that I am examining here, none the 
less, the sentiment is still that something too grave and too serious had happened to appreciate 
art after those horrors. Yet in the last half of the twentieth century comedy becomes as 
important—indeed, arguably more important—than tragedy. In, any case, I am not attributing a 
philosophy of comedy to Heidegger here. Rather, I am using philosophical insights gleaned from 
Being and Time and OWA, among other writings, to formulate a sketch of a philosophy of 
comedy.  
It is often difficult to disambiguate Heidegger’s own views on art from what he claims 
are Nietzsche’s views in his Nietzsche volumes, but it would seem wholly ridiculous to claim 
that Nietzsche did not have a profound influence on Heidegger’s philosophy of art.155 Therefore 
we should take seriously the claims Nietzsche makes about comedy when considering 
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Heidegger’s philosophy of art. For Heidegger, there is a twofold reason why this is important. 
First, according to Heidegger’s position in Being and Time, we exist as a happening that is a 
“thrown-projection.” According to Charles Guignon, “Heidegger suggests that instead of 
thinking of a human being as a substance or as an entity that is just present at hand among other 
items, we should think of a human as a happening or an event, that is, as the unfolding of a life 
story ‘stretched out between birth and death.’”156 As such, we are “thrown” into a world 
comprised of our past and a greater historical context of meanings that serves as “the source of 
the norms and conventions regulating the choices we can make and the directions we can pursue 
in making something of our lives.”157 We are also, according to Heidegger, always already ahead 
of ourselves because of our involvement in definite “projects” toward some future. 
This projected future dragging along its past only comes to be meaningful and authentic 
when it resolutely grasps its possibilities while heading toward its inevitable end in death. 
Guignon claims that “because our very being is defined by our ways of being projected into the 
future, we are a constant being-toward the defining culmination or realization of our lives as a 
whole.”158 To properly understand one of the defining existential features of our being, we must 
understand ourselves as beings with futural projects that shape and form us. When we inevitably 
forget or ignore this we become “absorbed in the ‘they.’”159 Heidegger claims this is how we are 
“proximally and for the most part” in our average everydayness. While Heidegger claims that 
this is not a moralizing critique or a negative mode of being, this way of being is considered 
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inauthentic and is called “falling” or “Verfallen.”160 And while this may be a type of inauthentic 
Being, it is still an important part of our Being, since falling is an existential mode of Being-in-
the-world.
161
 Further, Heidegger claims that “authentic existence is not something which floats 
above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness 
is seized upon.”162 Even though Heidegger says this, it is often overlooked that this “falling” and 
being part of the “they” are ontological features that need only be modified in order to achieve 
authenticity, no matter how fleeting said authenticity may be. 
If we take this interpretation of Heidegger to be correct, in its account of the human way 
of being (which he refers to as Dasein in Being and Time
163
), we can see why the aforementioned 
type of comedy might not at first appear to be particularly useful in coming to an understanding 
of the authentic meaning of our being. In this sort of comedy, we fail to take responsibility for 
our past and our future in order to focus solely on the pleasure of the momentary present. These 
comedies portray an inauthentic way of being, which can reveal something about the nature of 
“falling” for Heidegger. These fallen comedies can also be a constant source of satiation for 
Dasein’s fallenness. Comedy that takes no responsibility often shows up exemplifying what 
Heidegger calls “falling” or “fallenness.” This kind of comedy exemplifies the three 
characteristic features of “falling”: idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity.164  
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3.2. Fallen Comedy 
One example of idle talk, or Gerede, that Heidegger gives in Being and Time is gossip or passing 
the word, but idle talk includes more than that. Heidegger claims “idle talk is the possibility of 
understanding everything without previously making the thing one’s own.”165 By understanding 
everything, Heidegger means to point out that neither nothing important or actual about our 
authentic being is being understood nor anything substantial about the world, and certainly no 
new truth is disclosed. It is the sort of thing that “one” would say and is understood the way 
“one” does.166 Fallen comedy is not the sort of discourse that seriously brings Dasein’s past and 
future together for it to claim as its own in an authentic fashion. Idle talk is a modified type of 
discourse that instead of disclosing things to Dasein serves “rather to close it off, and cover up 
the entities within-the-world … The fact that something has been said groundlessly, and then 
gets passed along in further retelling, amounts to perverting the act of disclosing [Erschliessen] 
into an act of closing off [Verschliessen] … Thus, by its very nature, idle talk is a closing-off.”167  
So much comedy comes off in this way. We almost know the punch line before it is said. 
We already know the joke that is to be told, save for some slight nuance. This is the sort of 
comedy that says things like “you all know men are like this” and “women are like that” or 
“white people are like this” and “black people are like that.” Any version of the “idiot” joke also 
comes across this way. This is the sort of joke that mocks a particular group for its idiocy, 
whether actual or imagined. It does not really matter which group of people are trying to screw in 
the proverbial “light bulb.” These are the sorts of jokes and comic instances that you need to be 
within a certain world or shared framework of intelligibility to understand, but after that there is 
nothing more to be understood and often nothing more is disclosed. The comedy is not based on 
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anything actual (the comedian or comic actor serves as the everyman or Das Man
168
) and does 
not reveal anything so much as close off other interpretations that do not take the comedy as 
“one” would/should take it. Idle talk appears to reach a clear understanding even though it does 
not, and this discourages Dasein from new inquiry. We hear these same jokes over and over 
again, changing only slightly in their “retelling” and “getting passed along.” They disclose 
nothing new to our understanding. 
If we look at what Heidegger says about curiosity, we see that “it concerns itself with 
seeing not in order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being toward it) but just in 
order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another novelty … this kind of 
seeing … does not lie in grasping something and being knowingly in the truth.”169 This kind of 
comedy hides our Being-toward and is akin to always wanting to hear/see new jokes or comic 
performances without ever wanting or demanding of them to have substance or the ability to 
reveal truth. Fallen comedy ends up being a “constant possibility of distraction.”170 Much of 
what philosophers have said about comedy ends up pegging comedy as a type of distraction, 
recreation, or pleasurable and gratifying amusement. 
Fallen comedy is the kind of comedy that just gives us the next laugh or groan, only for 
the sake of the laugh or groan.
171
 One does not generally dwell on the fart joke, or a sex joke, 
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and, in a certain sense, there is nothing new disclosed through the perceiving of them. One 
might, however, attempt to authentically dwell on the fart joke or the sex joke if one considers in 
earnest wonder
172
 the place of the body and its unruly functions in our social context where 
“one” does not do or say things in this way. It brings to light a certain awkwardness of our 
assumed dualism in which our “mind/spirit/soul” should function smoothly and gracefully but 
often does not due to some bodily (mal)function. The woman is supposed to walk across the 
room, not slip on the banana peel. If we were disembodied minds, we would simply function 
smoothly and gracefully, but since we are in fact always embodied, this ungracefulness comes 
across as awkward, unsociable, and comic. It makes us shift our perspective to understand an 
oddly placed dualism in our world that deals with the expectations that “one” has for themselves 
and others, even though it is impossible to attain/maintain: i.e., everybody farts, and it is not 
always up to you as a disembodied mind to stop it when in an inappropriate situation. It is in this 
way that Bergson claims that all comedy is a type of social corrective.
173
  
If we consider this from a Heideggerian vantage point, the “they” can use laughter as a 
method of leveling down,
174
 as a closing off of certain possibilities of Dasein that do not cohere 
with the social order of one’s world. Diogenes the Cynic was perhaps the first philosopher to 
really bring to light the oddity of the public/private distinction for the way “one” ought to act. He 
would masturbate in the marketplace to the disgust and laughter of the ancient Athenians. This is 
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not what “one” does in public, in that shared social context, or in ours for that matter. Whenever 
I even relay this story to my students, they always laugh. Farting, masturbating, eliminating, and 
other bodily functions are humorous, particularly because they are not the way “one” ought to 
act, at least not in public. No one particularly needs to point this out to us, (or if they do it 
becomes an even more explicit case of leveling down). Instead, when it occurs, everyone sharing 
the same framework of intelligibility or social context is prone to laugh, often without the ability 
to prevent oneself from doing so, because we already understand the comic element in a way that 
is not entirely our own but is often disclosed as this sort of idle talk or discourse.  
This brings to mind that we are embodied; this perspective shift is not merely mental in a 
dualistic way. When we laugh unintentionally, the mind/body distinction seems to dissolve into a 
certain embodied comic joy. Heidegger claims that Dasein’s “Being-with-one-another in the 
‘they’ is … an intent, ambiguous watching of one another, a secret and reciprocal listening-in. 
Under the mask of ‘for-one-another,’ an ‘against-one-another’ is in play.”175 “One” can see this 
subtle “against-one-another” in play if we consider comedy a type of social corrective toward 
some cultural norm as Bergson does. Comedies often try and teach a lesson about being too rigid 
in one’s social context. The target of laughter is either too morally upright and stogy or too 
bawdy, ungraceful, or otherwise ill behaved. Unless we truly attempt to understand what it is that 
we are laughing at when we laugh, which seems to always be somewhat ambiguous, we have not 
truly attempted to dwell in an authentically wondering way.  
Heidegger claims that ambiguity or Zweideutigkeit is the third characteristic feature of 
falling. He states that ambiguity is: 
the sort of thing which is accessible to everyone, and about which anyone can say 
anything, it soon becomes impossible to decide what is disclosed in genuine 
understanding, and what is not … Everyone is acquainted with what is up for discussion 
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and what occurs, and everyone discusses it; but everyone also knows already how to talk 
about what has to happen first—about what is not yet up for discussion but ‘really’ must 
be done. Already everyone has surmised and scented out in advance what Others have 
also surmised and scented out. This Being-on-the-scent is of course based upon 
hearsay.
176
 
 
Ambiguity, along with idle talk and curiosity, maintains the mode of falling as according to 
Heidegger, “so long as there is a possibility of a non-committal just-surmising-with-someone-
else. Being “in on it” with someone” but without any allegiance.177 This sort of being “in on it” 
with someone really smacks of the kind of being we seem to exhibit when viewing something 
comic. All comedy aims at an audience that is “in on” the joke, even if that audience is small,178 
while laughing alone often amounts to what many take to be madness.  
We take the ambiguous position of laughing along with others at the comedy; we are “in 
on” the understanding of what is going on and what will be going on. We may take a position 
from the standpoint of hearsay, but not a committed one. People will often take part in laughing 
at sexist or racist jokes, but when confronted with a charge of sexism or racism they will be 
ambiguous about their position. Since they did in fact laugh, they cannot entirely disavow what 
happened, but they would not want to commit themselves to the bigoted position.
179
 They are 
generally unable to genuinely speak as to why they are laughing or what they are particularly 
laughing at. Alternatively, social or political jokes with an implied ground of commitment will 
often suffer the same fate, “one” might laugh at them but then have no allegiance or commitment 
to the position or agenda that the comedy is espousing. A certain level of commitment or taking a 
stand is necessary for an authentic mode of being. This is the sort of thing that people are not 
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often prone to take in relation to a comedy, since they prefer to be absorbed in the “they” in their 
fallenness.  
What is a fallen comedy or a true comedy has almost nothing to do with the artist or the 
artwork nor does it need to be explicitly structured in the ways I have described. It has much 
more to do with how the comedy is received by its audience or its preservers. The features I 
articulate here can only be a guide as to how these comedies are usually received; however, the 
openness of the comedy allows it to be received as either fallen or truth-disclosing, though the 
structure of the comedy itself can lend itself better to being received in one of these two ways. 
Comedy’s ambiguity, which I will touch on later, is different than the ambiguity of Dasein’s 
falling, though it does find itself rather at home in the “They.” 
In fallenness, in our absorption into the “They,” we can see a highlighted type of comic 
response. When Dasein laughs at comedy in the mode of fallenness, Dasein is laughing without 
an authentic understanding, and even if truth is revealed, it is not taken ahold of due to 
absorption and evasion. Often people who laugh at comic events without properly knowing what 
they are laughing at. Yet, people often notice if someone joins in on a laugh when they have just 
walked up, had not heard the entirety of the joke, or should not understand what they are 
laughing at due to the joke being “inside.” One seems to naturally “fall” into communal laughter. 
It is usually in these kinds of situations that this lack of understanding, or their fallenness, 
becomes conspicuous, since the laughing usually signals “understanding,” i.e., “getting it” or 
being “in on” the joke or comic event. It is only when something like this happens that Dasein’s 
inauthentic falling might become something noticeable and present-at-hand. For the most part 
falling is not something present-at-hand.
180
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Falling is usually a ready-to-hand smooth comportment through the world. We see it in 
the unthinking way we might ask about the weather, or ask and respond to the question of “how 
we’re doing?” or causally tell or laugh at a joke or funny image we encounter. In these situations, 
we are neither taking a hold of our past and our future in a resolute manner nor do we confront 
our inevitable death. Instead of striving for a wholeness in our lives, we lock ourselves into a 
holding pattern of evasion toward our own death. We would be in a “mode of evasion in the face 
of it [death]—giving new explanations for it, understanding it inauthentically, and concealing 
it.”181 The fallen comedy often presents a typical and ready-made character that will also likely 
exhibit this mode of fallenness and evasion.  
Most comedies do not involve the death of the protagonist(s), and they therefore lack the 
completeness of tragedies. The only true end to a life-story is, of course, death. The wholeness of 
an authentic life requires struggle and must be earned by taking a resolute responsibility for 
one’s past and one’s future possibilities in the face of one’s own death.182 Notably this is not 
something that Dasein can do as an individual isolated from the community; it must be done as a 
modified way of being Das Man. One’s own authentic possibilities are not a type of inward 
haecceity but rather something that must come from the real possibilities of one’s community 
and social context.
183
 Fallen comedy, or comedy that is not received as true comedy, is not going 
to help us authentically grasp Dasein’s being, and in that sense, these comedies are not going to 
be “great works of art.” Falling with its characteristic features “ensure[s] that what is genuinely 
and newly created is out of date as soon as it emerges before the public.”184  
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A comedy that can constantly bring into question the meaning of being anew is a comedy 
that will be a wellspring of great and lasting significance due to its ability to continuously draw 
our attention to this unresolved issue. Comedy can help highlight the ontological structure of our 
being; it can readily lend itself to sustain Dasein’s falling in a constant self-entangling, feeding, 
and maintaining of this mode of being in perhaps the most efficient way possible. A true comedy 
can help us to grasp our being in an authentic way as well as disclosing a type of primordial 
truth. It is not that comedy has not always had this capability nor that it has not worked this way 
continuously. The problem is that comedy has not been recognized as doing this or perhaps that 
this has been forgotten—and forgotten for a long time, perhaps since the time of the Greeks, but 
more likely since the advent of modernity.  
Still, most artworks, even tragedies, will mostly be taken inauthentically by Dasein. It 
appears that comedy is just much more prone to be taken in this inauthentic mode of falling than 
most other forms of art. This is perhaps why comedy is the preeminent genre of contemporary 
society in the US. It lends itself so well to the “They” and to “falling.” It feeds and sustains 
Dasein’s falling, ever evading the thought of death. It is almost the laughing away of death. This 
may present us with one of the most dangerous arts when it comes to grasping being 
authentically, but perhaps Heidegger and others should also consider comedy’s promise. 
 
3.3. Great Art, Comedy, and the Subject/Object Divide 
This brings us to the second reason for Heidegger’s neglect of comedy. Heidegger explicitly 
states in OWA that he is only concerned with “great art,”185 or, as Guignon puts it, “monumental 
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works of art, works that make a lasting impression on a culture.”186 Julian Young holds a similar 
position claiming that “art is only great if, like the Greek temple or medieval cathedral, it 
possesses world-historical significance.”187 These great works of monumental and world-
historical significance are considered from the vantage point of their current working within a 
still existent community that receives the artwork as meaningful or mattering. Most comedies of 
the ancient Greek era, by virtue of the lack of their preservation, no longer matter to any living 
community. These works cease to be at work and, as such, cannot presently be great or 
monumental works in the way that Greek tragedies are.
188
 Comedies on the whole tend toward 
having a deep level of hypercontextualization with their “moment in time” such that they rarely 
“make a lasting impression on a culture.” If they are comedies featuring falling, or are a fallen 
comedy, then due to the very nature of falling they are out of date as soon as they appear. 
Comedy tends to be about whatever is topical in a community and tends to lose its meaning over 
time due to a loss of context—unless such a context continues to be meaningful. We shall return 
to this shortly, but before we proceed any further, a better understanding of the work of art and 
its relation to the happening of truth must be adumbrated. 
According to Heidegger in OWA, the work of art is neither about the artist who 
Heidegger says is “almost like a passageway which, in the creative process, destroys itself for the 
sake of the coming forth of the work.”189 It is also not about some sort of subjective feeling or 
experience that we get from the work as object. According to Ian Thomson, “aesthetics looks for 
art in the wrong place (at a derivative rather than primordial level of human interaction with the 
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world).”190 If we consider a work of art like the Mona Lisa, which one generally considers a 
great work of art, one might consider what makes it a great work. 
As Guignon claims, great works of art “play the role of opening what he [Heidegger] 
calls a ‘clearing’ or an ‘open region’ in which anything can come to show up as meaningful in 
some way or other. And insofar as such a clearing is regarded as truth in the original sense of that 
word [aletheia, as unconcealment or disclosedness] … Heidegger can characterize a work of art 
as a ‘happening of truth.’”191 This happening of truth “opens up, in its own way, the being of 
beings. This opening up, i.e., unconcealing, i.e., the truth of beings, happens in the work … Art 
is the setting-itself-to-work of truth.”192 In a related way, Thomson claims that, rather than an 
aesthetic experience, artworks form and inform “our basic historical sense of what is and what 
matters.”193 Julian Young claims that this earlier understanding of the philosophy of art: 
took for granted that the point of art was to be ‘truth’-disclosing, to disclose to its 
audience, at least the outline, the shape of the proper way to live. That ‘aesthetics’ has 
displaced ‘philosophy of art’ reveals, Heidegger believes, that we have abandoned the 
ethical conception of art, Art, he holds, no longer provides, nor is expected to provide, 
guidance as to how to live. Rather, it is designed to provide ‘aesthetic experience.’194  
 
The ethical import of comedy as a social corrective never quite seems to lose this though, which 
may be why it is so hard to take comedy aesthetically.  
What the work of art opens up, according to Heidegger, is a world; the work sets up a 
world in the sense of the “world of Ancient Greece,” in the case of the temple at Paestum, the 
“world of the farmer,” in the case of van Gogh’s shoes, or the “world of US politics and 
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bureaucracy,” if we consider a television show such as Parks and Recreation. Heidegger claims 
that “standing there, the temple work opens up a world.”195 According to Guignon: 
such a temple is not merely an ornament or adornment that a group of people tacks on to 
its already established world. On the contrary, Heidegger holds that it is only through the 
temple that the world of this people comes to be realized and defined for the first time… 
the appearance of the temple opens a space of significance in which things can now show 
up as counting or mattering in determinate ways.
196
  
 
Instead of the work of art being merely a thing for our aesthetic pleasure, the work becomes the 
bedrock, framework, or “background of intelligibility for a community.”197 In this sense, the 
Mona Lisa transcends the subject/object divide.  
The Mona Lisa forms a world historical framework for all of Western painting. Its 
importance has to do with its history in the context of painting techniques and portraiture: the 
history surrounding it, including it being stolen, its place in the Louvre, and the continual swarm 
of spectators that flock to view it, its relation to Da Vinci, and its reception among its 
preservers.
198
 The Mona Lisa also elicits the question from its audience, “Why is this painting so 
great?,” which can bring one to dwell upon it. It could also easily be taken in an inauthentic 
mode of falling, i.e., the rushing to the front of the crowd at the Louvre only to take a picture of 
it before quickly and contently receding from it, or to quickly sit in aesthetic judgment before 
moving on to the next piece, perhaps the Venus de Milo or the next page of an art history book. 
When its entire social and historical context is taken from it and the painting is judged from a 
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purely aesthetic point of view, the judgment may be different. The work of art, when not taken 
aesthetically and taken in this Heideggerian way, brings into being a complex context of 
relations that reveals the happening of truth in a world. Heidegger claims that “Truth happens 
only by establishing itself in the strife and space it itself opens up.”199 This happening of truth 
occurs in the open space that is established in the strife between earth and world. By earth, 
Heidegger neither means this planet nor does he mean something like dirt. Earth is that which is 
concealed, sheltered, unresolved, undisclosed, and unexplained.
200
 Young claims that “it is this 
region of ineffability, the, as it were, epistemological ‘depth’ to Being, which Heidegger calls 
‘earth’ [is found].”201 The world, by contrast, is “defined as the disclosure of meaningful 
possibilities for action available to a people.”202 World is the open available options or “essential 
decisions in the destiny of a historical people.”203 The two of these are inseparable because 
“every decision … is grounded in something that cannot be mastered, something concealed, 
something disconcerting. Otherwise it would never be a decision.”204 Heidegger claims that 
“world is grounded on earth, and earth rises up through world.”205 Dreyfus claims that 
“Heidegger calls the way the artwork solicits the culture to make the artwork explicit, coherent, 
and encompassing the world aspect of the work. He calls the way the artwork and its associated 
practices resist such totalization the earth.”206 Thomson characterizes the relationship between 
earth and world when he says:  
Earth … both informs and sustains this meaningful world and also resists being 
interpretively exhausted by it. The earth provides that ‘combination of recalcitrance and 
support’ that allows a great artwork to quietly pulsate with an ‘inexhaustible abundance’ 
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of possibilities while also maintaining the sanctity of the uninterpretable within the very 
world of meaning it conveys.
207
  
 
It is in this inexhaustible abundance that comedy can be great. All comedy is polysemic in some 
way or another, and when it is “great” it has this inexhaustible character. For example, mocking, 
even especially vicious and one-sided mocking, can also be taken as “the highest form of 
flattery”; it is at very least reactively bringing to the fore the person or thing to be mocked, since 
it is deserving of our attention. Often times we are made to wonder whether certain jokes are 
morally permissible due to their ambivalence or if they are “just wrong.” So long as the comedy 
brings to light a meaningful decision that is not yet worked out, “resists totalization” in the 
context of our world, and remains “inexhaustibly abundant” with meaning, it can continue to 
work. Comedy is especially good at highlighting this tension between earth and world and often 
brings us to a new happening of truth due to a fresh comic interpretation.
208
  
According to Thomson’s interpretation of “great art,” a work will need to be able to 
transcend our common aesthetic way of viewing art such that we can take it in a mode of 
ontological pluralism or plural realism.
209
 The great artwork must be polysemic. Ontological 
pluralism or plural realism, according to Thomson, is about a multiply suggestive outline rather 
than a final design.
210
 Thomson claims that plural realism for Heidegger is:  
to no longer preconceive everything we experience as modern objects to be controlled or 
as late-modern resources to be optimized, but instead to learn to discern and creatively 
develop the independent meanings, solicitations, and affordances of things, staying open 
to the multiple suggestions that things offer us and dedicating ourselves to bringing forth 
such hints creatively and responsibly into the world.
211
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Comedy, which is always somewhat ambivalent, seems to be a perfect example of plural realism. 
This plural realism is a postmodern interpretation of art that attempts to escape aesthetics from 
within. Also, jokes/comic events in general seem to take our understanding beyond looking at the 
world as “resources to be optimized” or “objects to be controlled.” It makes our experience the 
sort of thing that is tarrying without this normal, i.e., modern/late-modern way of looking at the 
world.  
In “The Age of the World Picture,” Heidegger speaks of enframing (Gestell) and in 
“Question Concerning Technology” he writes about treating everything as a standing reserve to 
be optimized (Bestand). These two concepts taken together reveal our modern/late-modern 
framework: a framework that seems near impossible to overcome or transcend. The issue is that 
if Heidegger is right about our modern framework, enframing everything for optimum 
utilization, it seems as though we cannot escape aesthetics. It is our primary understanding of the 
world of art. However, Thomson provides an illuminating interpretation that leaves room for an 
escape from this framework. He states: 
Heidegger seems to mean us to take his words seriously: Aesthetic representation now 
possesses ‘a conceptual machinery which nothing can stand against’ … We reach a dead-
end, that is, until we hear these words differently, as instead suggesting that (the) nothing 
can indeed stand against the otherwise irresistible conceptual machinery of aesthetics … 
for Heidegger, the nothing is not nothing at all but, rather, does something; ‘the nothing 
itself noths or nihilates [das Nichts selbst nichtet]’ [P90/ GA9 114], as he notoriously put 
it in 1929. This active ‘noth-ing’ of the nothing was the first name Heidegger came up 
with to describe the phenomenological manifestation of that which both elicits and eludes 
complete conceptualization, an initially inchoate phenomenon we encounter when we go 
beyond our guiding conception of what-is.
212
 
 
It is not that we cannot escape the framework; it is that only through the Nothing that we can 
hope to transcend it. Thomson claims that this Nothing from “What is Metaphysics?” is an idea 
that Heidegger struggled with throughout his career giving it different names at different times. 
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Specifically he claims that this early “nothing that nihilates” becomes the “earth” in OWA and 
later “Being as such.”  
The Nothing or the earth or Being as such eludes proper description by its very nature. 
Anytime we could say something concrete about it we have attached being to it. How does one 
describe the ineffable, the inchoate, and the so-called “blooming buzzing confusion” that escapes 
conceptualization? It can only be talked around. Yet it is always there, and while it is easiest to 
conceive of visually as the “edges,” so to speak, of our active intentions of the world (i.e., that 
which is outside of what we are fully grasping, the fuzzy background of sorts), it is also there in 
our understanding, discourse, and moods. The trick seems to be to allow this inchoate nothing or 
earth to help allow us to let “being be” or unfold for us in a more open manner. 
Our expectations change when we are viewing a comedy, and we are more open to being. 
We allow fantastical and irrational situations to unfold without being sure about what to expect 
next, as comedy tends to elicit a sudden shift in our understanding of the situation.
213
 This shift is 
always already expected so long as we are in a comic mood, and thus, when viewing a comedy in 
a comic mood the modern/late-modern way of looking at the world must be transcended lest we 
miss what is comic in the comedy. We, as interpreters of a comic event, must creatively come to 
understand what, if anything, is humorous about it. This is evident when we fail to “get” the 
joke/comedy, or fail to “be in on it.” Our average everyday way of enframing the world mostly 
fails to make sense of comedy, as we must make sense of the comic outside of this framework. 
As Thomson might claim, this is an active and creative process that requires us to “see things 
differently.” We must take the lie, the exaggeration, or something that might seem entirely sad or 
terrible in another mood and try to grapple with a perspective shift such that the work now seems 
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comic. Otherwise we end up taking the sarcasm, irony, or hyperbole as just a lie and the artist of 
such comedy as a liar. Further works are now suspect since they might not lead to the proper 
optimization or control of the world we live in; in fact, the comic seems to have very little to do 
with any of that.  
The idea of optimizing the comic in some sort of modern technological way strikes us as 
funny. The Comedy Central show South Park has an episode addressing this.
214
 The 
aforementioned episode depicts a comedy awards show where the Germans are awarded the 
prize of “least funny people in the world.”215 The Germans, who are seriously offended by this, 
have their scientists create “the ultimate-comedian”: a robot, the XJ-212 Funnybot, which is 
made to logically produce the funniest jokes and to prove that the Germans are not the least 
humorous people on the planet. It is often said that jokes are all about timing, and they claim that 
the Funnybot has perfect timing within 0.0001 milliseconds. This is an obvious attempt to show 
optimal maximization of comic timing. The robot is so successful that it puts all other comedians 
out of work. The robot eventually determines that comedy is optimized when the maximum 
amount of awkwardness is produced, and therefore the most awkward situation would be to 
destroy all life on earth, since “nothing would be more awkward than destroying that which 
created Funnybot.”216 Aside from the jab taken at Germans for not being very funny and for 
creating a machine that plans to kill all humans, this episode reveals something true about 
comedy, i.e., that it is not the sort of thing that can be logically optimized and controlled the way 
we take most other objects in our world. 
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Comedy cannot just be a matter of qualities inherent in the object, i.e., the artwork, 
something that a machine could logically optimize and mass produce. Otherwise we could just 
have one comic robot tell all the jokes, or analogously, we do not really need new art or art at all. 
For that matter, nature could suffice in an aesthetic framework so long as we already have 
optimized pieces of beautiful and sublime work. Perhaps all we need is a sunset and a picture of 
the churned-up sea. It also cannot be merely a subjective projection; we need others to laugh or 
else we will appear unintelligible, immoral, or mad (or perhaps just nervous and out of place as 
Freud would claim). Something of a shared mood and world that transcends the subject/object 
divide is necessary for the comedy to work. Something akin to Thomson’s plural realism seems 
to be at work in true comedies. It is necessary to note that while almost all works of art could 
transcend this modern framework, and to show this is the goal of many Heideggerians doing the 
philosophy of art, comedy is special in that it is the least likely to lend itself to an aesthetic 
interpretation. 
Another way in which comedy works can be highlighted through the structure of “the 
joke” or, in comedy generally, is our openness to being when we are attuned in a comic way. 
Perhaps a joke can make this clearer. A racehorse has been getting old and hasn’t won a race in a 
while, and he knows that if he doesn’t win a race soon, or at least come in third, that his owners 
would surely kill him. So when he spies the best racehorse at the track he trots up to him and 
says, “Hey do you think you could throw the next race for me? I’m kind of getting old, and I 
haven’t won a race in a while, and if I don’t at least show in the next race I’m sure my owners 
are gonna send me to the glue factory. Do you think you could do me this favor to save my life?” 
The prizewinning horse replies, “I don’t know. I don’t know you, and I’m not sure if it’s right to 
throw the race. That seems like it might be cheating and immoral. Also, how do I know you’re 
80 
not trying to scam me? And further, even if I am saving your life, Kant would always say it is 
wrong to cheat, as that is not universalizable.” The first horse then says, “Come on, they’re 
gonna kill me if you don’t throw this race. Do you really want that on your conscience?” The 
prizewinning horse begins to look uncomfortable and says, “I’m just not sure I can do this for 
you.” At this point a dog, who had been nearby and heard the whole exchange, walks over to the 
two horses and says to the prizewinning horse, “How could you not throw the race! What could 
possibly be more moral than saving this guy’s life?” Then the one horse looks at the other and 
says, “Holy shit, a talking dog!”217 The point of this joke is to highlight how much is taken for 
granted in our framework of intelligibility when we are comically attuned or in a comic mood. 
We allow fanciful and fantastic states of being to go unquestioned. That there are talking horses 
seems natural for the joke, and then we allow for them to be creatures engaged in a moral 
quandary, which seems fine too. We even allow for the horse to exhibit the human expression of 
discomfort. Even more surprising, we allow the horse a basic understanding of Kantian morality. 
We go along unsure of where the joke is leading us. This is the inchoate and undisclosed 
earth element in comedy. We attempt to grasp what the point of this is without a clear 
understanding of its being as of yet. The joke reveals a certain tension between earth and world 
that is to come to better light with its punchline, though not ever fully. We have the unclear and 
unquantified earthy tension of “where this is all heading” within the fantastic world of the talking 
racehorses at the track. This joke then jars us back into the context of “reality” with its punch 
line and makes us think about jokes and joking in general, or rather, it illuminates the structure of 
the joke and the comic mood. Comedy allows us to change our usual way of being in the world 
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by entering into a comic mood, which allows the world to be disclosed in different ways. Things 
become more polysemic. Comedy can offer a fresh perspective on a meaningful decision that 
needs to be worked out, and it has the advantage of a mood that allows for a much greater 
openness to being. A serious mood would not allow such fantasies as talking horses and would 
immediately assume that the speaker was lying or mad.  
I believe that this understanding that a comic mood can better allow for new and different 
perspectives is at the root of what Nietzsche is getting at when he calls for “gay science” or 
“joyful wisdom” in The Gay Science. Nietzsche is practically quoting Kant when he states that 
“‘where laughter and gaiety are found, thinking does not amount to anything’ … let us prove that 
this is a prejudice.” 218 Kant and others want to claim that a comic work “produces no thought 
that carries any interest with it … [and] by which in the end nothing is thought.”219 If comedy 
can in fact get at a happening of truth and help open up a world or allow us to come to a 
meaningful stand on a decision, then it may be shown that this is indeed just a prejudice. 
 
3.4. True Comedy 
The happening of truth that occurs in a great work of art is the working out of meaningful 
decisions in the context of a historical people’s significant possibilities. This “working out” 
requires there to be something to be “worked out,” so it is necessary for there to be unexplained 
and inchoate elements or else they would not be what we properly call “meaningful decisions.” If 
someone were to ask me if I made the decision to wear shoes today, I might be inclined to say 
no, since I did not really deliberate over it or really even think about it. There was nothing 
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confusing, unexplained or concealed in this context, and therefore the “decision” (if we want to 
call it that) was at the very least not meaningful. If, on the other hand I want to go to an all-day 
music festival, “the world of the concert,” where I am likely to have my feet stepped on, I might 
have to make (a somewhat) meaningful decision about whether I want to wear boots to protect 
my toes or sneakers to protect against blisters. In this situation my future possibilities are not 
settled (they are concealed by earth), and I must come to a decision about the welfare of my 
feet.
220
  
According to Guignon, “the artwork sets up a challenge to a people, and the people 
realize and define what is at stake in that challenge by taking a stand on what is questionable and 
unresolved in their world.”221 Heidegger uses the example of Antigone, a tragedy by Sophocles, 
to highlight how a great drama “transforms that speech [the work] so that now every essential 
word fights the battle and puts up for decision what is holy and what unholy, what is great and 
what small, what is brave and what cowardly, what is noble and what fugitive, what is master 
and what slave.”222 It may at first seem inappropriate to include comedy as a work of art that can 
“transform speech” and “put up for decision what is holy and what unholy,” but only if we 
concern ourselves with what I have called fallen comedy. Comedy can often bring to light 
hypocrisy and what we deem “unholy” through wit, irony and mocking. It can delimit what is 
“holy,” not just reveal the “holy” itself.  
Julian Young, interpreting Heidegger in a way that would seem true to Heidegger 
himself, claims that the earth in OWA is also the “holy” and the “mysterious” and that “the 
fundamental character of “earth” as it occurs in “The Origin” is, I believe, that it is the principle 
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of holiness.”223 Young points out the “truth happens awesomely because the world presences as 
holy.”224 This interpretation is based on the examples that Heidegger gives in OWA, i.e., the 
Greek temple, the cathedral, and the tragic play that is part of a holy festival. It is also based on 
the later writings on Hölderlin’s poetry, which look to the festival in the Greeks, the betrothal of 
men to gods, the wedding, holy mourning, and round dance. 
225
 All of these “holy” festivals 
brought us beyond a mere holiday in the sense of cessation of work or Arbeitspause and into 
authentic wonder and a festive mood that can lead to authentic care.
226
 Young goes on to claim 
that Heidegger wants us to think of art in a festive mood, which is similar to Nietzsche’s 
Apollonian and Dionysian split. He claims that the Dionysian is like the earth, a type of 
uncontrolled and boundless chaos that is tempered by the Apollonian intelligibility and 
individuation that is the world. He points out that the Greek “tragic” festivals were not like 
modern theatre, since these were true festivals in a religious or holy sense, i.e., something that 
ethically orients us in our world.
 227
 Heidegger believes that we have lost this and that we can 
only regain this by transcending the aesthetic interpretation of art and by fulfilling “the essential 
character of any festival—the gathering together of community with that “wonder” that happens 
in the work (the “communal” condition).”228 While none of this seems particularly comic, save 
for the “communal” condition, I believe this is where we can see how and perhaps why 
Heidegger and Young neglect comedy. 
The funny thing about Heidegger and his understanding of the festive is that it lacks at 
least half of what is truly festive. The Dionysian included tragedy and comedy, ending with the 
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latter, which gave them the last resonating note. I do agree with Young that the earth/world 
distinction roughly mirrors the Dionysian/Apollonian distinction from BoT, but it is far from 
being the more rigidly structured event that Heidegger describes. Laughter and the carnivalesque 
seem to be part and parcel with the festive. Writers such as Bakhtin and Charles Taylor put a lot 
of importance on this point. What would a festival be without laughter? In the Middle Ages, 
festivals could last for about three months of the year.
229
 They were communal egalitarian events 
that were chaotic and dissolved many of the normal boundaries that existed for them. Further, 
they delimited the holy, the sacred, and the well-ordered hierarchical existence that they were 
used to. Heidegger and Young by default only tend to look at the well organized and ordered 
festival events and elements. What Heidegger neglects in the comic is the important element of 
disorder and chaos that marks the truly egalitarian communal festival. This disorder and chaos 
are not used pejoratively; they can ambivalently swing both ways between producing what 
Young wants to call authentic care and an oblivious and violent cruelty.
230
  
Though Taylor does not take this quite as far as Bakhtin would like, he still holds the 
position that carnival (i.e., the festival life of the medievals) was necessary as a certain sort of 
release valve for their exceedingly well ordered and rigidly hierarchical society. He wants to 
claim that “[t]he weight of virtue and good order was so heavy and so much steam built up under 
this suppression of instinct, that there had to be periodic blow-outs if the whole system were not 
to fly apart.”231 These blow-outs happen because of a primitive tension between the opposites of 
order and chaos or structure and anti-structure.
232
 These medieval festivals have an egalitarian 
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view that produces a topsy-turvy world: feasts of misrule, boy bishops, making the fool king for 
a day, and the use of masks to hide and equalize one’s identity. In ancient Athens they would 
even release prisoners from jail for the Dionysia.  
The delimiting of the holy was a crucial part of the festival but perhaps even more 
important was the appeal to community: Taylor, following Victor Turner, makes the insightful 
claim that “[t]he order we are mocking is important but not ultimate; what is ultimate is the 
community it serves; and this community is fundamentally egalitarian; it includes everyone.”233 
It is not the betrothal, the wedding, or the round dance that make the festive mood; it is the 
drunken reception thereafter. It is in the equal mingling of the families, rather than their 
structured division at the ceremony, or the shoving of the cake into each other’s faces, rather than 
the solemn vows that are taken, that make the festival festive.  
According to Taylor, festivals reflect a certain sort of necessity of opposition. Kosmos 
and Chaos need each other, and as Taylor claims, “all structure needs anti-structure.”234 For 
Taylor, these ancient religious orders always allowed for an outside and a limit to their order; 
they were delimited by the festival and, in a certain sense, by the comic.  
The problem with rational modern secular orders is that they are self-enclosed and fail to 
have an outside, or delimiting. They consider themselves without a limit and or an outside to 
their perfected rational order. There can be no change save for revolution, since these orders lack 
the anti-structural element. Taylor concludes that “we need to tack back and forth between codes 
and their limitation, seeking the better society, without ever falling into the illusion that we might 
leap out of this tension of opposites into pure anti-structure, which could reign alone, a purified 
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non-code, forever.”235 This anti-structural element found in festival was used to loosen 
boundaries. The festivals more than being just release valves allowed the boarders, boundaries, 
and limits of the order to be tested and adjusted even after order was restored. This is why it is 
not simply a strict binary of opposites; it alters what was once the order. It is in this way that 
comedy can have its highest level of efficaciousness. It can create an alterity that in not a merely 
a transitory antipode to the reigning order.  
Perhaps in a way similar to how anxiety “is what first makes fear possible,”236 the festive 
mood may be what first makes the comic mood possible. It may be the opposite end to anxiety 
that we find our primordial grounding in care (Sorge). Perhaps it is in an egalitarian oneness with 
Being-in-the-world as such that we may also find care, coming from no one and nowhere in 
particular. The festive again mirrors anxiety in the sense that we are festive about our “authentic 
potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world.”237 The possibility of freedom and change are inherent in the 
festive, and the festive and festival, as all of the aforementioned authors have noted, seems to be 
a basic, fundamental, primordial, and ineradicable component to the human way of being as 
such. 
 
3.5. A Heideggerian Interpretation of Aristophanes 
Perhaps this festive mood is hidden from us, and perhaps it has been forgotten, but if it exists our 
authors would have to all agree that it should appear in ancient Greek comic and tragic festivals. 
So now we turn to a phenomenological examination of ancient Greek comedy. 
Aristophanes, a contemporary of Sophocles, crafted great works of comedy for his world. 
Our preservers and historians have maintained eleven out of approximately forty plays by this 
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comic playwright and a number of these plays are still performed regularly.
238
 The works of 
Aristophanes are generally considered Old Comedy.
239
 The key features that distinguish Old 
Comedy are that it usually directly mocked, slandered, or insulted powerful, contemporary, 
social, religious, or political figures and often addressed topical social, cultural, and political 
issues.
240
 Much of what was funny in these plays required a shared understanding of that 
particular people’s past and some investment in their future. This ridicule was also directed 
toward a projected futural thinking about an existing figure or issue in that world. The prominent 
political figure Kleon brought charges of slander against Aristophanes after a particularly 
scathing assault on his character.
241
 Plays such as Lysistrata, Birds, and Clouds all bring forth 
controversial discourse on meaningful issues of that time: war, for instance, in the first two cases, 
the role of women in society in Lysistrata, and what to make of Socrates in the latter case. From 
what we have of Old Comedy, we can see that it is very much concerned with taking a stand on 
meaningful decisions that must be made. These comedies playfully take up both the past and the 
future in an attempt to produce a happening of truth from the strife between the world of the 
comedy and the concealed and as yet unresolved issues brought forth by the earth. This can be 
seen in the following interpretation of Lysistrata—a Heideggerian interpretation, if you will.242 
The plot of Lysistrata is simple; the women of Athens and Sparta are tired of the 
Peloponnesian War that has been devastating all of Greece and plan to end it by staging a sex 
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strike until their husbands declare peace between Athens and Sparta. While the play is silly, and 
rife with belligerent sexual props, innuendo, and bawdy scenes, the work of art “puts up for 
decision” something of the utmost importance, war. The Peloponnesian War was still going on 
when this play was first performed and all of Athens was in great peril. This topic of peace and 
war shows up often in Aristophanes’ preserved works. Birds may be interpreted to be a pro-
war
243
 or an ironic anti-war play. It brings to presence more inchoate earth than many of his other 
plays. This play, which is still often performed for contemporary audiences, has many ironic 
themes coursing through it. These ironic themes make it difficult to provide an authoritative 
interpretation, as is often the case with comedy. It is left up to the historical community of the 
time to interpret its meaning or to leave it open in its polysemy. 
Each occasion of presenting a play is a new happening of truth. Heidegger claims that 
“the establishment of truth in the work is the bringing forth of a being of a kind which never was 
before and never will be again.”244 Gadamer similarly makes the Heideggerian claim that “the 
viewer of today not only sees things in a different way, he sees different things.”245 A production 
of Lysistrata today is a very different happening of truth than it was to its original fifth-century 
world. At that time all of the actors were men dressed in women’s clothing wearing ridiculous 
looking masks. Part of the comedy and truth of the world of the fifth-century occasion of the play 
is found in the fact that women behaving in this fashion would have been considered ludicrous, 
and not in the way you might first think.  
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Women were not to be involved with politics directly and had no legitimate control over 
their husband’s fornication during this era. Aristotle, when speaking of tragedy, claims that it is 
difficult to make a woman appear “good” or “useful” (χεῖρον), and she should never be portrayed 
as clever (δεινήν) because it is not fitting (οὐχ ἁρμόττον).246 When Lysistrata is presented in a 
contemporary performance, it is usually acted by both sexes, and while the women’s bawdy 
behavior may be funny, we are not struck by the ludicrousness of women engaging in politics 
and engaging in it well. The relationship of mutually exclusive sexual fidelity, which is the norm 
of our historical community, was not present in the “world of ancient Athens.”  
Foucault points out in his History of Sexuality, volume 2: The Use of Pleasure that the 
husband and wife relation of this era was one-sidedly set up for exclusivity on the part of the 
wife only. There were no official taboos for the husband. His sexual congress with someone 
other than his wife was culturally permissible, however, being exclusive was a mode of self-
mastery that was praised. This is also an era where the rape of one’s wife was not illegal. The 
women address the issue of “being forced” early in the play. Lysistrata tells them to resist until 
beaten but then to “submit, but disagreeably: [because] men get no pleasure in sex when they 
have to force you.”247 This seems to be a disconcerting solution to say the least. Many of these 
ancient ludicrous elements of the play are no longer part of our interpretation of the play 
(thankfully). 
Heidegger could claim of this play that “the world of the work that stands there has 
disintegrated.”248 There is a sense in which these plays are what has been and that this world can 
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never be regained. The world of the happening of that Lysistrata has decayed and lost some of its 
former self-sufficiency. Despite this, Lysistrata is still a working work of art in the sense that 
certain of its elements still have a very meaningful context that provides a “background of 
intelligibility for a community.” The role of women in society is still an issue that we must take a 
stand on. We still sadly inhabit a mostly male-dominated world despite our best efforts to 
overcome sexism. Also, the question of war in a democracy is always put to a decision in each 
historical community that presents this play. It is because this play has had a “lasting impression 
on culture” that I claim it is a great or monumental work.  
As was stated earlier, comedy’s topical nature causes it to be hypercontextualized to a 
very specific time within a very specific world. If the context or topic that is addressed in a 
comedy is no longer present in the community of a historical people, the world decay begins. For 
comedy this can happen rapidly. The happening of truth becomes stale, and the workings out of 
the decisions put into question are no longer relevant.
249
 Unlike tragedies, comedies become 
much more noticeably decayed because jokes and humor trade on a shared context of 
intelligibility where incongruities and ridicule are meaningful. When jokes fail they come forth 
as inchoate earth that we can no longer understand nor interpret; they are no longer meaningful 
in the context of our world. 
Almost all becomes the inchoate earth when you can no longer provide a meaningful 
interpretation for the work of art. Jokes about people that we have no historical record of 
illuminate a concealing of an original truth of the work that has suffered an obtrusive and 
conspicuous world-decay. A comedy can be a “great” or monumental work when it has an 
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impact beyond the time of its reception and when it takes up a world’s past and future, its 
thrownness and projection, as an essential feature of its work. The working out of the truth of a 
very particular historical world is instantiated best through the works of comedy, but by the same 
token, it generally leads to the closing off of its reinterpretation by future preservers. This is the 
main reason for our lack of preservation of comedies. While they are incredible historical, 
philological, and philosophical records, most of them fail to be compelling works of art. Their 
meaning is so contextualized that the work often soon closes off the meaning at stake. Guignon 
claims “as long as the work is working, its meaning is open-ended, constantly in contention, 
defined by decisions a people makes in taking up its challenge and carrying it forward in 
time.”250 I contend that comedy deserves an equal role to tragedy when its works are taken as 
great, i.e., when they are received as true comedy and when they are not; we can still learn about 
a very specific happening of truth for historical people at a particular time or what works of art 
feed into falling for people. In this danger of fallen comedy there seems to lie the promise of true 
comedy, authenticity, and the festive as such. 
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Chapter 4: The Conclusion; the Use and Abuse of Comedy for Life—Notes for a 
Nietzschean Philosophy of Comedy 
 
4.1. Introduction 
We learned in the last chapter why Nietzsche in his early work disparaged a certain type of 
comedy and why Heidegger neglected comedy. We were able to see an interpretation of what I 
have called fallen comedy that would fail to be great art for both Heidegger and Nietzsche. We 
were also able to see an interpretation of what I have called true comedy, which is truth-
disclosing in the Heideggerian sense. Truth here is meant as more of a way of interpreting the 
work of art such that it is impactful and efficacious; it may even create a world in some cases. 
This kind of comedy is a great work of art in the Heideggerian sense. It is the type of artwork 
Nietzsche praises for being a “stimulant” to life that leads to activity rather than a “narcotic” that 
leads to passivity.
251
 We saw how comedy does not fit into the usual aesthetic interpretation of 
art, and how art—and specifically comedy—can help us transcend the modern aesthetic 
paradigm. This, in turn, allows us to approach a postmodern interpretation of the world. This 
approach seems to best come from a festive or comic mood. For Heidegger, this festive mood 
should seem to be almost an imperative not just for understanding great works of art but also for 
philosophy and for thinking. 
 It is because of this paramount importance of the festive mood that we now return to 
Nietzsche, for once we have Heidegger’s criticism of the aesthetic and his insistence that an 
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artwork discloses a world, we are in the position to appreciate the impetus and insights that 
Nietzsche provides for a philosophy of comedy. I can hardly help but begin with Nietzsche’s call 
for “gay science” or “joyful wisdom.” There are many places in Nietzsche’s corpus where he 
calls for a cheerfulness, gaiety, joyfulness, etc. in our thinking well, in our philosophizing, or in 
our art. These calls for gaiety are almost ubiquitous. This does not mean that we are talking 
about happiness or being without suffering. Rather, what is being called for is a certain 
perspectival taking of the world, something that might be akin to a Heideggerian mood. This 
festive or comic
252
 mood is something that Nietzsche addresses well when he is waxing about 
one’s way to escape the weightiness of one’s tradition, morality, or self. 
 
4.2. The Spirit of Gravity 
And when I saw my devil I found him serious, thorough, profound, and solemn: it was 
the spirit of gravity—through him all things fall. Not by wrath does one kill but by 
laughter. Come let us kill the spirit of gravity!
253
 
 
From Nietzsche’s first published work in The Birth of Tragedy until the works of his last sane 
moments, he constantly concerned himself with comedy. While comedy certainly takes a back 
seat to tragedy in the earlier works, it comes to the fore in the middle and late works. It is a funny 
thing that in Nietzschean scholarship, comedy and Nietzsche’s general comic style and tone are 
so often neglected. Michael Ure rightly points out that Nietzsche’s comic tone is often missed by 
his critics,
 
and even Nehamas misses this in his excellent book, Nietzsche: Life as Literature.
254
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However, Ure observes that Keith Ansell-Pearson does not miss Nietzsche’s “mocking tones of 
self-parody.”255 It is of critical importance to understand the role comedy plays in Nietzsche to 
properly understand him. Comedy also leads us to a postmodern ethical interpretation that gets 
us beyond “games of truth” and the ascetic ideal as exhibited through the will to truth. This is a 
truly novel approach to ethics that could prove to be quite efficacious. If this Nietzschean 
interpretation of the value of comedy is in fact efficacious, it will show us how comedy may be 
the greatest of the arts and not just a matter of mere amusement or intoxication. 
Nietzsche’s concern with comedy becomes obvious in The Gay Science.256 The Gay 
Science’s title practically demands comic interpretations, or at least interpretations that need not 
be weighty, severe, serious, or graven. The German word Schwere is often used by Nietzsche to 
describe the “spirit of gravity” and a general lack of cheerfulness that usually accompanies “good 
thinking.”257 Comedy and foolishness get juxtaposed with Truth and seriousness throughout The 
Gay Science. Nietzsche is also rather concerned with comedy in his On the Genealogy of Morals, 
particularly in the third essay, but also in the preface. In that book it appears that the only thing 
that can combat the ascetic ideal and the will to truth is a “comedian of the ideal.”258 Nietzsche 
begins one of his last works, Twilight of the Idols, by speaking of the “cheerfulness” and 
“prankishness” needed for the revaluation of all values. Finally, while many find Ecce Homo to 
be a pretentious book because of its style and chapter titles, we should really consider the whole 
of that book to be comic. Titles from that book like “Why I Write Such Good Books” and “Why 
I am So Clever” are meant to be comic, not serious. This is not to say he does not think his books 
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good or himself clever but that he recognizes the perspectival and comparative character of 
judgments about his books and his cleverness. These are comic titles because they have the 
polysemic ambivalence that marks comedy. We should also consider just how much comedy is 
involved in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. The work itself is a parody or a satire of the Bible, and 
while book 4 is a slightly contentious book owing to its limited original publication, it smacks of 
comedy throughout; one of the final sections is entitled “The Ass Festival,” which has the same 
insulting and funny ring to it in German. George McFadden rightfully points out that Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra is much more of a parody and a comedy than it is a tragedy; he claims “the book is 
anything but tragic.”259  
The spirit of gravity (der Geist der Schwere) and laughter are both central themes in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra. The spirit of gravity shows up in all four books of Zarathustra
260
 but 
nowhere else by this particular name in the rest of Nietzsche’s corpus. However, the spirit of 
gravity represents a central position in the evolution of Nietzsche’s thought that is especially tied 
to aesthetic self-creation, metamorphosis, self-overcoming, and experimentalism (the Versucher 
of Beyond Good and Evil 42 and 210). Laughter too has a special and particular role in the 
evolution of Nietzsche’s thought, which must be dealt with if we are to properly understand the 
spirit of gravity and how to kill it with laughter. 
First, it is important to recognize that the term Schwere in German does not simply mean 
gravity. The term is also defined as (and more often used to connote) seriousness, heaviness, 
difficulty, severity, weight, or as Kaufmann often translates it, something grave. This term and 
its variations show up quite often in Nietzsche’s corpus. The heavy, grave, and severe spirit that 
                                                          
259
 McFadden, “Nietzschean Values in Comic Writing,” 343. Some such as Paul Loeb, in his The Death of 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), claim that Zarathustra is a tragedy where 
he dies at the end of book 3 and book 4 is the Satyr play. Also, Babette Babich makes a similar claim about this.  
260
 Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part 1, “On Reading and Writing”; part 2, “The Dancing Song”; part 3, 
“Vision and Riddle” and “On the Spirit of Gravity”; and part 4, “The Awakening.” 
96 
Nietzsche claims as his devil is personified in a variety of ways in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. He 
claims first that it is his “thundercloud,” and devil, 261 and later that it is a monster that is half 
dwarf and half mole.
262
 The spirit of gravity’s first appearance in Thus Spoke Zarathustra is in 
“On Reading and Writing,” so we shall begin there. 
Nietzsche claims in “On Reading and Writing” that “aphorisms should be peaks—and 
those who are addressed, tall and lofty.” Aphorisms are Nietzsche’s favored style of writing; thus 
this is an important point that high elevation is necessary for those who want to understand him. 
The fastest way between mountains, he claims through the voice of Zarathustra, is from peak to 
peak, but flying rather than hiking is the fastest way from peak to peak. The spirit of gravity, 
which is later characterized as half dwarf and half mole, is neither tall nor lofty. In fact, it is quite 
the opposite: short, burrowing, and blind (even subterranean). Flying and floating appear quite 
frequently for Nietzsche as metaphors for the distance between oneself and one’s tradition and 
morality, a distance one needs in order to make oneself into an artistic phenomenon that one is 
not ashamed of. If we look to aphorism 107 of The Gay Science, Nietzsche claims that our lives 
are made bearable
263
 if we transform them into art. It is here that he first really attacks the spirit 
of gravity. To quote Nietzsche at length: 
At times we need a rest from ourselves by looking upon, by looking down upon, 
ourselves and, from an artistic distance, laughing over ourselves or weeping over 
ourselves … Precisely because we are at bottom grave [schwere] and serious human 
beings—really, more weights than human beings—nothing does us as much good as the 
fool’s cap: we need it in relation to ourselves—we need all exuberant, floating, dancing, 
mocking, childish, and blissful art lest we lose the freedom above things that our ideal 
demands of us … We should be able also to stand above morality—and not only to stand 
with the anxious stiffness of a man who is afraid of slipping and falling any moment, but 
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also to float above it and play. How then could we possibly dispense with art—and with 
the fool?—And as long as you are in any way ashamed before yourselves, you do not yet 
belong with us.
264
 
 
This flying and floating gives us the artistic distance necessary to really craft ourselves as 
different from our tradition. It is also the metaphorical distance that is necessary for one to be 
able to laugh at oneself. According to Bergson, emotion (and specifically pity) kills laughter, but 
intellectual distance or a certain absence of emotion allows for things to be laughable.
265
 
Nietzsche assumes that people are generally very serious (i.e., schwere) about themselves, their 
tradition, and their morality. He implies that being able to laugh at oneself and to accept one’s 
own foolishness and folly on the other hand is far more rare, but also preferable. The point about 
not being ashamed before oneself is critically important to Thus Spoke Zarathustra and the spirit 
of gravity, but it will likewise be important in later works, such as On the Genealogy of Morals, 
where Nietzsche urges us to overcome the shame of our “bad conscience.” This gravity that 
keeps us from having an artistic distance from ourselves and our tradition causes us to be more 
weights than human beings, and honesty about our existence without the help of art leads us to 
great “nausea and suicide.”266 This honesty leads to a suicidal nihilism that really comes from the 
discoveries made when serving the will to truth. The “freedom above things” that is mentioned 
above is a freedom from the spirit of gravity. This freedom, however, is not the freedom of “free 
will” but the freedom of the “free spirit,” which happens to be the subtitle of the first of what is 
                                                          
264
 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §107. 
265
 Henri Bergson, Laughter: An Essay on the Meaning of the Comic, trans. Cloudesley Brereton and Fred Rothwell 
(London: MacMillan and Co., 1911), 2–3. It is noteworthy that the condition for laughing here includes and 
expunging of pity, since Nietzsche so often rails against pity. Nietzsche would always prefer laughter rather than 
pity, even if the laughter was directed at him. See Nietzsche, Daybreak, eds. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 381; Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, part 2, “On Pitying”; 
Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, §293, and Nietzsche, The Anti-Christ, §7. 
266
 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §107. Nietzsche is also getting at this point throughout The Genealogy of Morals but 
especially in §3, and is a major theme for The Birth of Tragedy and The Will to Power. 
98 
dubbed Nietzsche’s middle works (and his first truly aphoristic work), Human, All Too Human: 
A Book for Free Spirits.  
 Even from this early middle period (1878) in his writing, we might think that he was 
trying to fight something like the spirit of gravity with its contrasting class, the “free spirit.” In 
Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche explicitly rails against any understanding or belief in 
something like free will. This leaves one to wonder what is meant by the “free” part of the “free 
spirit.” In aphorism 225, Nietzsche claims that:  
he is called a free spirit who thinks differently from what, on the basis of his origin, 
environment, his class and profession, or on the basis of the dominant views of the age, 
would have been expected of him. He is the exception, the fettered spirits are the rule… 
what characterizes the free spirit is not that his opinions are the more correct but that he 
has liberated himself from tradition, whether the outcome has been successful or a 
failure.
267
  
 
Even in this middle work, Nietzsche points out that it is not about the “free spirit” being correct, 
i.e., having a hold of the truth, but about something else instead. The “fettered spirits,” or as 
Nietzsche later calls them in Beyond Good and Evil, the “chained type of spirits,”268 make up the 
herd and are opposed to all new values, philosophies, and ways of life. The freedom here, or 
floating and flying, if you will, is more of a distance from the norm, from society’s mores, or 
even from the self that you have cultivated thus far. This chained spirit happens to be at the end 
of the chapter entitled “The Free Spirit” in Beyond Good and Evil. Here Nietzsche also spends 
time attacking the concept of “free will” while explicating what he means by “the free spirit.” 
 In the chapter entitled “The Free Spirit” in Beyond Good and Evil, Nietzsche describes a 
type of future philosopher. Versucher is the German word for attempter, tempter, searcher, 
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researcher, or experimenter. These free spirits make their lives into experiments,
269
 seeking to 
find their own truths, knowledge, judgments, and good.
270
 The “free spirit” judges and evaluates 
from an artistic distance.
271
 Metaphorically, this distance is the distance of an elevation at odds 
with that which we are grounded by, namely the spirit of gravity, or our embeddedness in our 
time, tradition, morality, or even our self. The own-ness of the aforementioned truths, 
knowledge, judgments, and good is of particular importance with regard to the spirit of gravity. 
 According to Zarathustra, “he, however, has discovered himself who says, ‘This is my 
good and evil’; with that he has reduced to silence the mole and dwarf who say, ‘Good for all, 
evil for all.’”272 The “mole and dwarf” represent the spirit of gravity in this quote, and it is the 
spirit of gravity that claims universal, atemporal good and evil. This is the form of Nietzsche’s 
true archenemy and devil. Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, Gay Science, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, Beyond Good and Evil, On the Genealogy of Morals, and Twilight of the Idols all 
have as a central theme getting beyond the unjustified atemporal and universal binary of good 
and evil. This was a major theme throughout what is called Nietzsche’s middle and late periods.  
 
4.3. On Genealogy 
Historically, culturally, and even for the individual, good and evil are relative terms for 
Nietzsche, and, according to things he says in all of the works mentioned above, good and evil 
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are generally terms used to tame and codify civilization.
273
 “Good for all, evil for all” breeds 
stability and shame. The shame that we are speaking of here comes from “bad conscience,” 
which is another important Nietzschean theme developed in many places over his corpus, but 
most pointedly in his later work, On the Genealogy of Morals, where he claims (mostly in essay 
2)
274
 that “bad conscience” is an internalization of the guilt we feel for our animal instincts, 
urges, and drives that do not harmonize with civil society. This guilt that we feel over our animal 
instincts is both necessary as “a rule” for the masses of society and as an alien imposition for 
every individual.
275
  
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche claims that this bad conscience, and 
consciousness itself, was the last thing to form in humans and thus always puts us into a strange 
relationship with our more animal inclinations. After all, what good does our fight-or-flight 
adrenaline boost do us in civil situations of fear and anxiety? In our prehistory, this would have 
served us well in helping us run and escape or confront an enemy or physical threat, but it does 
us no good to start sweating, to turn red, and to elevate our pulse rate in a boardroom, at a job 
interview, while giving a lecture, or in an argument in civil society. In fact, our animal responses 
in these sorts of situations are often just an embarrassing, shameful hindrance. Perspiration 
stains, shaky hands, and a red face do not exactly inspire confidence in one’s prospective 
audience.
276
 
 Any sort of “abnormality,” according to tame and civil society, with its historically 
contingent yet codified set of “good and evil,” is something to feel ashamed of and is a grave 
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(schwere) burden to the individual. If we return to Zarathustra for the moment, we may see what 
Nietzsche means: 
Earth and life seem grave [schwere] to him; and thus the spirit of gravity [der Geist der 
Schwere] wants it. But whoever would become light and a bird must love himself: thus I 
teach...We are presented with grave [schwere] words and values almost from the cradle: 
‘good’ and ‘evil’ this gift is called. For its sake we are forgiven for living. And therefore 
one suffers little children to come unto one—in order to forbid them [at] bedtimes to love 
themselves: thus the spirit of gravity orders it… we are told: ‘Yes, life is a grave 
[schwere] burden.’ But only man is a grave [schwere] burden for himself! That is because 
he carries on his shoulders too much that is alien to him … he loads too many alien grave 
[schwere] words and values on himself, and then life seems a desert to him. And verily, 
much that is our own is also a grave [schwere] burden!
277
 
 
In Thus Spoke Zarathustra, the spirit of gravity gives us good and evil and teaches us to feel guilt 
and shame for living. This is most often found in Judeo-Christian slave morality, in what 
amounts to “original sin” and shame for loving our life in this world. Nietzsche claims that 
instead of embracing life-affirming values, we have life-denying, ascetic values loaded upon us 
so that we may reach the next, more perfect “world beyond.”278  
According to Zarathustra, we must necessarily be embedded in this tradition and become 
loaded down by it before we can float and fly from it.
 279
 Zarathustra claims that “he who would 
learn to fly one day must first learn to stand and walk and run and climb and dance: one cannot 
fly into flying.” 280 Much like the “Three Metamorphoses of Spirit” that begins Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra, this is a learning process. Defeating the spirit of gravity is going to require a 
learning process. We must also take time to try and understand our context and ourselves
281
 in 
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this learning process, and each one of us is different and has a different “way,” so to speak. 
Zarathustra continues, stating that:  
by many ways, in many ways, I reached my truth: it was not one ladder that I climbed to 
the height where my eye roams over my distance… That, however, is my taste—not 
good, not bad, but my taste of which I am no longer ashamed and which I have no wish 
to hide. ‘This is my way; where is yours?—thus I answered those who asked me ‘the 
way.’ For the way—that does not exist.282  
 
Again, in the greater context of the Nietzsche corpus, this applies to the “free spirits” of both 
Human, All Too Human and Beyond Good and Evil. It also applies to the variegated aesthetic 
phenomena that we are supposed to be from The Gay Science, and to those in the process of 
sounding out the idols while revaluating all values from Twilight of the Idols. Nietzsche also 
mentions these “free spirits” again in On the Genealogy of Morals, pointing out that if they still 
believe in Truth, then they are not truly these free spirits; this belief in Truth is a belief in “the 
way,” which makes them not really the “free spirits.”283 In all of these cases, there is an 
individual learning process, metamorphosis, experimenting, or self-overcoming that  is opposed 
to what is metaphorically the spirit of gravity.
284
 In all of these instances, a “cheerful,” “gay,” or 
comic mood for the free spirit seems to be a type of precondition; otherwise, how could they 
laugh at the spirit of gravity? 
 The freedom and distance necessary to laugh at the spirit of gravity is not easily won, and 
Nietzsche’s relation to laughter and comedy is quite particular, much like his relationship to the 
use and value of art. Some scholars claim that “with certain qualifications Nietzsche’s thought 
may be said to comprise not a tragic but a ‘comic’ philosophy.”285 Others, like Mark Weeks, 
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think Nietzsche is mostly a tragic thinker who “imaginatively conceived a futuristic laughter … 
Nietzsche projected a transcendental laughter that would become the object of desire, a driving 
force of the will.”286 I think both of these claims are right to a certain extent.  
 
4.4. Nietzsche on Comedy and Laughter 
Nietzsche’s philosophical writings start with a focus on tragedy and then shift to a specifically 
more comic perspective beginning with The Gay Science that continues throughout the rest of his 
works, although he never abandons the tragic sense.
287
 The chronology of his works aside, 
Nietzsche works a certain form of comedy and laughter into his work while denigrating another 
kind. Even as far back as The Birth of Tragedy, we can overcome the horror and absurdity of 
existence either with sublime art or “the comic as the artistic discharge of the nausea of 
absurdity.”288 Weeks claims that  
Nietzsche argued that such nausea should not be relieved but should be tragically 
overcome. He thus bemoaned the role of popular comedy in the cultural ascendancy of 
ready satisfaction, ‘cheerfulness in a state of unendangered comfort,’ a ‘womanish flight 
from seriousness and terror, this craven satisfaction with easy enjoyment (BT, 11).
289
  
 
However, Nietzsche here attacks New Attic Comedy. Nietzsche’s problem with New Attic 
Comedy is that it focuses on “the cheerfulness of the slave who has nothing of consequence to be 
responsible for, nothing great to strive for, and who does not value anything in the past or future 
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higher than the present.”290 In Old Comedy, such as in Lysistrata, Birds, Peace, and Wasps, 
central themes involve topical political and juridical themes of the day that were not about “easy 
enjoyment” and did place a high value on the future; most of Aristophanes plays are an attempt 
to inspire action in the polis, which gives them an ethical and efficacious dimension. 
 Nietzsche does, however, have a negative view of mob or slave comedy and laughter.
291
 
Weeks points out that even Zarathustra is driven from the town by icy laughter in the prologue. 
But he then points out what he calls a daring maneuver for Nietzsche, when “rather than attack 
laughter, he challenges his readers, through Zarathustra, to will a new kind of laughter, one that 
will not collapse the temporality of becoming and the will to redeem time through the narrative 
of special advancement.”292 In “On Vision and Riddle,” Zarathustra exclaims after seeing a 
shepherd bite the head off of the “heaviest” (schwerste) snake (which may represent the spirit of 
gravity) that has crawled down his throat: 
Far away he spewed the head of the snake—and he jumped up. No longer shepherd, no 
longer human—one changed, radiant, laughing! Never yet on earth has a human being 
laughed as he laughed! O my brothers, I heard a laughter that was no human laughter; 
and now a thirst gnaws at me, a longing that never grows still. My longing for this 
laughter gnaws at me; oh, how do I bear to go on living! And how could I bear to die 
now!
293
  
 
The end of this aphorism points toward metamorphosis, change, and self-overcoming. 
Zarathustra only comes to this point after having dealt with the most grave (schwere) thought of 
the eternal return of the same. It was a process and not just an ex nihilo sublimation that caused 
this transformation of the shepherd.  
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This aphorism also points toward future humans or philosophers, as Nietzsche is often 
prone to do. Thus Spoke Zarathustra ends in a hopeful longing for these future men, possibly 
Übermenschen. Nietzsche holds out hope for men to come who will be able to laugh this 
laughter. Even still, regular human laughter is able to dispel the spirit of gravity. When 
Zarathustra speaks of the higher men who have come to visit him, he claims “if they learned to 
laugh from me, it still is not my laughter that they have learned. But what does it matter?... This 
day represents a triumph: he is even now retreating, he is fleeing, the spirit of gravity, my old 
archenemy.”294 The issue here is that this laughter may dispel the spirit of gravity, but it will not 
kill it. Just as the mole-dwarf whispered into his ear: “You threw yourself up high, but every 
stone that is thrown must fall.”295 It does not seem that the spirit of gravity has been defeated by 
this kind of laughter, because it is still human laughter. Nietzsche ends Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
with an image of the laughing lion because his “higher men” have all disappointed him. 
Nietzsche leaves open a future pregnant with possibility, but that future is not actualized.  
In the end, mob laughter seems petty and without future. The laughter of higher men 
toward the spirit of gravity shall dispel it for a time, giving them elevation or artistic distance. 
But in the end, these higher men of the present age shall still succumb to the spirit of gravity 
according to the age-old proverb that what goes up must come down. They are still ashamed in 
front of themselves, as most civilized men are, and even in their attempts to become free spirits, 
the fetters of gravity bring them back to their own embeddedness in tradition.
296
 Laughter may 
kill the spirit of gravity, but Weeks seems right in deeming that laughter as “Super-laughter.”  
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But dispelling the spirit of gravity for a time with regular human laughter still seems to be 
a worthwhile venture. Being able to distance oneself from one’s tradition and the prevailing 
“Truth” of that tradition seems to be the best route available to us, especially if we are trying to 
be “free spirits” or attempting a revaluation of all values. To get beyond this “Truth,” art and 
particularly comedy can be interpreted in Nietzsche’s corpus not as “the way” but instead as a 
particularly productive way to produce new interpretations not dependent on atemporal and 
universal “Truth.” 
Comedy is quite often a hiding place, a refuge, a guise, or a mask. It aims not at Truth; or 
perhaps it would be better to say that it seeks truth by being antagonistic or agonistic. There is 
some safety in the ambivalence of comedy. It seems that a bit of merrymaking creates a mood 
that can mollify even the more hard-hearted or serious (i.e., schwere) observer, even if it is not 
something they care to hear or see. Unless the comedy is directed at them as the proverbial “butt 
of the joke,” comedy seems to safeguard itself from real censorship or prohibition. Even the 
kings had their jesters. Comedy may often feel as though it is speaking the “Truth,” but its 
deceptive nature or framework always brings it back from the brink of being the ascetic will to 
truth. Even the most one-sided satire has a bit of ambivalence in it. If we think of a roast, we 
might better understand this ambivalence. 
Both Foucault and Nietzsche point out that direct negative satire mocks and derides but at 
the same time reinvigorates the forms of power that it targets.
297
 They claim that what is being 
mocked is worthy of such mockery and of sociopolitical concern. Nietzsche states in Twilight of 
the Idols, “Whether we immoralists are harming virtue? Just as little as anarchists harm princes. 
Only since the latter are shot at do they again sit securely on their thrones. Moral: morality must 
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be shot at.”298 It reestablishes the importance of the target. We should also note that this 
statement has a bit of joking tone to it, especially at the end.
299
 Nietzsche is pointing out that we 
ought to attack morality even if we are not going to get beyond it, although this can validate the 
existence of power. 
Comedy’s flexibility and ambivalence highlight Foucauldian power in its own 
ambivalence and ambiguity. Comedy often forms a point of resistance or transgression that is 
also involved in reestablishing that which it is resisting or transgressing. In the ancient Greek 
world, Aristophanes mocked and derided, but he also brought to the fore and reestablished the 
importance of people like Kleon and Socrates, and even of the gods, such as Dionysus.
300
 As 
Xavier Riu points out, this seems to be a type of “sacred insult” along the fashion of a roast.301 
Bakhtin also points out that in the early Roman tradition, while there was a eulogy for the dead 
and praise given in the ceremony of the triumphal procession, derisive mockery was also part of 
both of these practices (much like in a roast, where the speakers lambast and then 
compliment).
302
 The power of comedy and the comedian as well as fiction in Nietzsche’s 
philosophy is in combating the ascetic ideal.
303
 This comes out of overabundant health and 
cheerfulness.
304
 Even the superiority theory of comedy claims to make some people cheerful. 
Nietzsche’s claims in The Gay Science that “laughter means: being schadenfroh [feeling pleasure 
from someone else’s suffering] but with a good conscience,” and he claims not to have 
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resentment for people who laugh at his “faults and blunders.” Such resentment would be akin to 
slave morality’s reactive ressentiment.305 While the superiority theory of comedy certainly has its 
faults and shortcomings, there are aspects of it with which Nietzsche seems to agree.  
Nietzsche might agree with Bergson in that comedy needs to distance itself from all 
emotion/feeling, sympathy, and pity in order to be laughable.
306
 Nietzsche might here add 
atemporal and universal Truth to the list of things we are distancing ourselves from. Comedy 
perhaps more than any other art requires us at once to be intimately familiar with the context in 
which we operate, but it also requires a certain “pathos of distance,” as Nietzsche calls it in On 
the Genealogy of Morals. Comedy much more than other art forms seems to represent as good 
the “will to deception”; it is an art in which the lie is sanctified.307  
The ascetic ideal is the central theme of On the Genealogy of Morals. Nietzsche really 
starts to develop this concept once again at the beginning of his middle period, in Human, All 
Too Human and in Daybreak,
308
 but it does not come into its own full philosophical robustness 
until the Genealogy. The ascetic ideal strangely both protects one against suicidal nihilism but 
also necessarily draws one closer to it. According to Nietzsche, the ascetic ideal espouses life-
denying values in order to provide meaning for our suffering.
309
 
Lawrence Hatab has a particularly insightful article on the ascetic ideal, in which he 
claims that “the fundamental question at the heart of GM: [is] the value and meaning of natural 
life”310 over and against the life-denying values of the ascetic ideal, whether those espoused by 
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priests, artists, scholars, philosophers, or even scientists. As Hatab writes, “life-alienating forces 
in human culture; this is the core meaning of the ascetic ideal, whatever form it takes.”311 One of 
the strangest pills to swallow for “we moderns” when we closely read essay 3 of On the 
Genealogy of Morals is the fact that Nietzsche lumps together the priest, artist, scholar, 
philosopher, and even the scientist as handmaidens to the ascetic ideal. Most people view science 
and religion as being opposites or as at least espousing very different values. Nietzsche, 
however, points out that this is not really the case. The aforementioned types of people all fall 
under the spell of the ascetic ideal for one particular reason: “the overestimation of Truth.” The 
ascetic ideal has a goal, and even claims to have the goal: 
[i]t permits no other interpretation, no other goal; it rejects, denies, affirms, and sanctions 
solely from the point of view of its interpretation…it submits to no power, it believes in 
its own predominance over every other power, in its absolute superiority of rank over 
every other power—it believes that no power exists on earth that does not first have to 
receive a meaning, a right to exist, a value, as a tool of the ascetic ideal, as a way and 
means to its goal, to one goal.
312
 
 
Nietzsche points out in Thus Spoke Zarathustra: “the way—that does not exist.”313 And in 
Beyond Good and Evil, he points out that the truth is not the truth for everyone,
314
 thus denying 
its universality and metaphysical existence as part of Being. What Nietzsche is getting at here I 
will call an exclusive monoperspective. Both religion and science have these vantage points; they 
both have an interpretation that excludes all others and so can only interpret the world through 
their own understanding of revealed truth or the best-fitting physicalist theory available. Often 
modern people look at philosophers and scholars as “nonbelievers,” feeling they are the “pale 
atheists,” “immoralists,” and the “last idealists of knowledge.” They may think that they are 
Nietzsche’s “free spirits,” but they “are far from being free spirits: for they still have faith in 
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truth … it is precisely in their faith in truth that they are more rigid and unconditional than 
anyone.”315 Science is not the opposite or contraposing force to the ascetic ideal, because science 
lacks a: 
value-creating power … this pair, science and the ascetic ideal, both rest on the same 
foundation … on the overestimation of truth (more exactly: on the same belief that truth 
is inestimable and cannot be criticized). Therefore they are necessarily allies, so that if 
they are to be fought they can only be fought and called into question together.
316
  
 
Both religion and science vie for the exclusive monoperspective, and the reason they seem so 
often juxtaposed or in contention is not because they are opposites but rather because they are so 
very similar, like siblings in a bloody dispute over ascendency to the throne of Truth.  
The problem with all of the former types of people is that they are still all dependent on 
the will to truth expressed through the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche puts proselytizing atheists—and 
there are many of those who like to tell all theists about their idiocy due to their lack of 
understanding the truth of science—on the same level as proselytizing theists. Neither of these 
groups has the resources to combat the ascetic ideal, because they both rely on the Truth. 
Nietzsche claims that “[the] will to truth requires a critique… the value of truth must for once be 
experimentally called into question.”317 The value of truth being called into question 
“experimentally” harkens back to Beyond Good and Evil.318 This is where his 
“experimenters/attempters,” or in the German, Versucher, are the new philosophers, who will 
still love truth, but a nonuniversal truth, i.e., a truth associated uniquely with the individual or 
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“free spirit” but also more with Becoming and not with Being (in the traditional ways that these 
terms are parsed out).
319
  
It is in this way that Heidegger explains why Nietzsche values art more than truth. 
Heidegger claims the problem is “Truth, i.e., true being, i.e., what is constant and fixed, because 
it is the petrifying of any single given perspective, is always only an apparentness that has to 
prevail, which is to say, it is always error … Art, as transfiguration, is more enhancing to life 
than truth, as fixation of an apparition.”320 The question becomes what kind of transfiguration is 
art? Heidegger does not himself notice what is going on at the end of On the Genealogy of 
Morals or in the rest of Nietzsche’s corpus because of his overemphasis on the unpublished notes 
that became The Will to Power. This, however, is exactly what I want to address now.  
 
4.5. Overcoming the Ascetic Ideal 
Since we are trying to affirm life and escape from the ascetic ideal that arises from the will to 
truth, we are left to wonder: if not truth, then what shall be our guide to the future? Nietzsche 
answered this question over and over again, starting with The Birth of Tragedy,
321
 but also in 
Human, All Too Human,
322
The Gay Science,
323
 and finally in On the Genealogy of Morals.
324
 
The answer to what can oppose the ascetic ideal is “Art—to say it in advance, for I shall 
someday return to this subject at greater length—art, in which precisely the lie is sanctified and 
                                                          
319
 Heidegger’s truth is much more similar with this kind of truth. Truth which he claims is relative on Dasein in 
Being and Time, §44, is neither universal and atemporal, nor does it appear that way in “The Origin of the Work of 
Art,” or the Essence of Truth. 
320
 Martin Heidegger, Nietzsche, volume 1: The Will to Power as Art; volume 2: The Eternal Recurrence of the 
Same, trans. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 214, 217. 
321
 Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, §5, §7, §11, §24. 
322
 Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, §151; though Nietzsche is far more derisive about art in this book than any 
other. 
323
 Nietzsche, The Gay Science, §107. 
324
 He also writes about the saving power of art in The Will to Power but that book is contentious for a variety of 
reasons. 
112 
the will to deception has a good conscience, is much more fundamentally opposed to the ascetic 
ideal than is science.”325 Nietzsche never got the chance to return to this subject at “greater 
length,” but some of his ideas can be found in the notebook for The Will to Power. There he 
claims that when man can no longer create fictions (or even Truth as a type of fiction) then he 
will create nihilists. If there is one thought that hovers over Nietzsche’s works from beginning to 
end, it is the threat of passive or suicidal nihilism.
326
 In order to fight against this nihilism that is 
produced by the ascetic ideal, art can save us as the lie sanctified. As Nietzsche points out in The 
Gay Science, the poet and the liar are like brothers, but we hate the liar who is not a poet because 
we expect from him the truth. We do not expect such things from poets, i.e., artists. This “will to 
deception” that has a “good conscience” is the will that opposes the will to truth. If we start by 
accepting art as untrue, which we usually do, but maintain faith in it because of its value as either 
life-affirming or life-denying, then we can start to combat the ascetic ideal.  
Most interpreters of Nietzsche follow this interpretation, but what they fail to notice is 
that instead of a tragic solution, here Nietzsche points instead to a comic one: 
All I have been concerned to indicate here is this: in the most spiritual sphere, too, the 
ascetic ideal has at present only one kind of real enemy capable of harming it: the 
comedians of this ideal—for they arouse mistrust of it. Everywhere else that spirit is 
strong, mighty, and at work without counterfeit today, it does without ideals of any 
kind—the popular expression for this abstinence is ‘atheism’—except for its will to truth. 
But this will, this remnant of an ideal, is, if you will believe me, this ideal itself in its 
strictest, most spiritual formulation, esoteric through and through, with all external 
additions abolished, and thus not so much its remnant as its kernel. Unconditional honest 
atheism (and its is the only air we breathe, we more spiritual men of this age!) is therefore 
not the antithesis of that ideal, as it appears to be; it is rather only one of the latest phases 
of its evolution, one of its terminal forms and inner consequences—it is the awe-inspiring 
catastrophe of two thousand years of training in truthfulness that finally forbids itself the 
lie involved in belief in God.
327
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So it is not atheism and science with their will to truth that can oppose this ideal but instead the 
artist as comedian of the ascetic ideal, since she arouses mistrust—i.e., she can undermine the 
ideal itself. A good comedian must understand their context and their audience for their art to 
work. So a comedian of this ideal would need to be part of this tradition, in the way of the camel 
from Thus Spoke Zarathurstra’s “Three Metamorphoses of Spirit.” It would need to be someone 
akin to what Nietzsche has been calling his “free spirits,” since they would also need the artistic 
distance from the tradition itself to be able to mock properly. 
These comedians would need this distance also to feel free from the paralyzing pity and 
emotion that makes one “grave,” i.e., schwere. If one is “too serious,” one cannot mock the 
ascetic ideal. It is the cheerfulness, gaiety, or festiveness that seems to be necessary to overcome 
this ideal through art, and particularly through comedy. This is not a complete divorce from 
one’s tradition, as it seems that that is really impossible, but instead a comic distancing or 
elevation from mocking. This comedian can produce comedy that takes one’s past and one’s 
future and one’s tradition thoughtfully, though not seriously. 
But comedy made out of weakness/slave morality lacks responsibility and does not 
consider the past or the future as ideal.
328
 Comedy has the ability, because of its generally 
accepted deceptive nature or framework, to get beyond all truth games while still being 
incredibly efficacious and often ethical or moralizing. Bergson claims that comedy is essentially 
a social corrective. Comedy distinguishes itself in kind from other fictions, such as fantasy, 
myth, or fairy tale, in that its morals are not one-sidedly accepted as true. Comedy does not 
present an exclusive monoperspective; i.e., there is no ambivalence or ambiguity in “The 
Tortoise and the Hare” nor in “Hansel and Gretel,” nor in “The Boy Who Cried Wolf.” They all 
produce monoperspectives that leave little room for interpretation or polysemy. Comedy, as 
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Bakhtin points out, can lose (and in late modernity often has lost) almost all of its ambivalence if 
it is purely one-sided satire and is therefore an overly or overtly moralizing kind of comedy.  
This, however, is a kind of sliding scale. On the one hand, we have comedy that is 
conscientiously trying to be a pointed, negative critique (most often seeming like the superiority 
theory), and, on the other hand, we often run into comedies with no avowed standpoint, political 
view, or moral critique (e.g., the New Attic Comedy that Nietzsche describes, or the fallen 
comedy I described in my last chapter). Comedy at its best can often present a type of alterity in 
ambiguity, next to or other than the binary moral of fantasy, fairy tale, or fallen comedy. Comedy 
has greater flexibility (while maintaining its efficacy) than other forms of art. Knowledge of 
context is necessary before something may be comic, but what we take away is up to us.
329
 Do 
we return to our former values unchanged? Or does the great comedian/comedy change the way 
we value our values, particularly those values that we hold sacred? It seems to hold as a general 
rule that the funniest comedies/comedians deal with the things most sensitive, sacred, or taboo, 
so long as we are not too sympathetic or empathetic to the cause, as Bergson points out (or as 
Plato points out in his Philebus). 
Art as the good will to deception has the power to save us from nihilism.
330
 Comedy can 
be this great art, in the sense of being a cheerful, less serious taking of the world. It can be a 
childlike taking of the world—a childlike laughter at the world, as prescribed in Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra. Zarathustra asks not “What are we free from?” but rather “What are we free for?”331 
Comedy and genealogy are a way of taking the world less seriously, i.e., with less gravity or 
Schwere, such that we can more easily change our traditions and beliefs when they no longer 
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serve us well (what have I to do with refutations?).
332
 Any dogmatic ethics has a rigid quality 
about it, and every ethics based on honor or purity has a level of pride that will not allow it to be 
changed easily. When you hold some set of beliefs as apodictically “True,” or in this case as 
right or good, you appear foolish when they fall short in some area. 
Inevitably and almost necessarily because of the passage of time, every morality will fall 
short somewhere, at some time. People generally hate appearing foolish, but an ethics that 
embraces or at the very least accepts foolishness would not have to respond in vengeful hatred. 
When we hold our beliefs to the standard of a supreme fiction, so to speak, we have a back door 
allowing escape from shame.
333
 Appearing foolish when in a comic stance is not shameful; 
rather, it is expected.  
Just because something is comic does not mean that it is less valuable or that it has less 
meaning. As I have already claimed, the comic is necessarily polysemic and often leans toward 
the ambivalent. The comic can be of great importance to our lives and the way that we comport 
ourselves. The comic can have just as great an impact on us as anything considered under the 
guise of seriousness. Part of the meaning of “gay science” is that even the physicists know that 
their so-called laws are only convenient fictions that certainly “work” but are still not 
apodictically true. Physicists can believe in their supreme fictions in the sciences even though 
“proof,” “data,” and “facts” still cannot provide apodictic certainty. Why then is it so hard to take 
this approach toward ethics?  
We do not consider past scientists foolish or shameful for being wrong, but we do feel 
that way when our ethics come up short. We have a long history of trying the same experiments 
with the same results in the field of ethics. As Nietzsche points out, perhaps we should consider 
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another perspective for this field—perhaps a less serious and more comic approach. 
Contemporary philosophers such as Stanley Cavell
334
 and Cynthia Willett
335
 attempt to work 
through ethics with comic libidinal relationships, but it is by no means a popular choice when it 
comes to ethics. It is not coincidental that both Willett and Cavell use Nietzschean themes when 
explicating a libidinal ethics.
336
 
The comic is always a perspectival approach. It is always fueled by a nonstandard way of 
looking at the world. The comic takes the all-too-serious, the sacred, and the taboo and looks at 
them from the viewpoint of the body, i.e., he, she, or they; it looks at them from the standpoint of 
a cheerful mood of laughter, and laughter always brings things back to the body. It makes us 
wonder sometimes whether we should be laughing, or whether another’s perspective is so alien 
to ours that they can laugh at something we find unfunny or even perhaps reprehensible, thus 
bringing an ethical dimension in almost without our consent. This is part of the power not just of 
comedy but of poetry in general. 
Poetry, music, drama, and comedy have always been efficacious in moving people to 
action, especially when prose fails.
337
 This is why poets have always been powerful and why the 
ancients thought that the poets spoke truth (though Plato claimed that they “lie too much”). 
Nietzsche also says the poets lie too much, echoing Plato,
338
 but for Nietzsche the lie and the 
deception that is art are more important than the truth.
339
 Heidegger tries to explicate why “art is 
worth more than truth” for Nietzsche, but he misses the core of what Nietzsche is up to in that 
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statement from The Will to Power. Though a very complicated issue in Nietzsche scholarship, 
“Truth” for Nietzsche seems to be a historically agreed-upon concatenation of lies.340  
Truth for Nietzsche is not just about subjective experience or perception. It is perhaps 
closer to intersubjective agreement, although this agreement is probably false. It is akin to error 
theory, which is to say there is no truth, only errors, though some of these errors are useful. The 
veils are social constructs, but they never bottom out; there are just veils or masks all the way 
down. This is why art is more important and profound than truth for Nietzsche; art has an 
honesty that truth lacks, since truth lays claim to a universal exclusive monoperspective (i.e., 
there cannot be multiple truths about a single statement), but art starts off claiming to be a certain 
kind of invented falseness. 
Comedy’s poetic ability to entertain and its current popularity allow it to reach a wider 
audience than a directly “truthful” communication. We might cite Horace here when he says 
“joking often cuts through great obstacles better and more forcefully than being serious would.” 
The philosophy of art is degraded by the title aesthetics because it makes art into a narcotic, as 
Nietzsche says in The Gay Science.
341
 When art is only about a supposed universal-subjective 
judgment that one ought to feel, we miss the entire sociopolitical and ethical efficacy that art can 
have.  
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